provisions relating to the determination of the status of a « national » and by extension, of a clear distinction between nationals and foreigners. Then, the national legislations concerned also take the historical legacies of the colonial territorial administration as reference point; namely, the sole European nationality prevailing before any existence of African nationalities. Finally, the time limit adopted is common and cross-cutting: the point of departure is the date of gaining international sovereignty. This date also coincides with the date of the legal establishment of most of the post-independence African nationalities. In the African context, these fundamental constituent elements of the original or initial legal establishment of nationality are unavoidable notwithstanding the option each State was able to make towards the acquisition of nationality by the jus sanguinis and jus soli principles exclusively and concomitantly. Consequently, the silence or the failure to clearly take into account the fundamental principles of nationality is likely to impede the enjoyment of the right of recognition of legal status. This applies particularly to thousands of persons whose presence and residence came long before the establishment of legal nationality. 111. This conclusion is based both on jurisprudence and also on international law. From the standpoint of jurisprudence, the Commission further notes that apart from its conclusions in Legal Resources Foundation and Modise, it also considered in Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan that a decree whose terms authorize the restriction of freedoms for vague reasons or are based on mere suspicions violates the spirit of the Charter.28 Such a conclusion derives from the logic, to the extent that when the law is vague and lacks precision, it opens the door for arbitrariness, abuse and its interpretation is dependent on the goodwill of the authority vested with power. 112. The recognition of the pernicious and intrinsically flawed nature of unclear standards has become generally well known both in the practice of national courts and before regional human rights protection organizations.29 In this regard, the Commission adopts the doctrine of « invalidity on grounds of vagueness » which quite rightly requires to be purely and simply declared null and void and without any effect; that is any standard which in essence already consists of seeds of improper application or simply a deprivation of a See Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91 et 89/93 (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999) para 59. 29 See South African Liquor Traders Association and Others v. Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others, Constitutional Court of South Africa (2006) para 27 ; Prosecutor c. Robert Sekabira and 10 Others, High Court of Uganda, Decision 0085-2010 paras 12-13 ; Newspaper “La Nación” v. Costa Rica, Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Case No. 12.376 para 162 (2001) ; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, European Human Rights Court, Decision of 12 January 2010, para 85. 28 32