26 M.C. v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT between consent and submission; every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent ... [The jury] should be directed to concentrate on the state of mind of the victim immediately before the act of sexual intercourse, having regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particular the events leading up to the act, and her reaction to them showing their impact on her mind.” 141. According to some legal commentators, despite Olugboja, the reality is that prosecution is unlikely to proceed where women have submitted in circumstances of similar psychological duress and entrapment to those in Olugboja, but in the absence of threats. 142. The prosecution must also prove the mens rea of rape, which is either knowledge that the victim does not consent or recklessness as to whether she consents or not. The perpetrator is reckless where he “never gave it a thought”, or was aware that the other person “might not be consenting but goes on just the same” (R. v. Gardiner [1994] Criminal Law Reports 455). (v) The United States of America 143. The fifty States define what is commonly referred to as “rape” in a number of different ways but, despite significant variations in wording, the States converge on the question of non-consent. In particular, it is an established principle that a victim is not required physically to resist her attacker to prove that she did not consent to the act. Verbal expressions of dissent suffice. In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz (641 A.2d 1161 (Pennsylvania, 1994)), the defendant had sexual intercourse with an acquaintance in his college dormitory room although she said “no” throughout the experience. The Pennsylvania courts held that the victim's repeated expressions of “no” were sufficient to prove her non-consent. 144. In thirty-seven States, non-consensual intercourse without extrinsic force (force extrinsic to that required to effect penetration) is expressly criminalised by statute as a felony, a sexual crime of the highest order, or a misdemeanour. Although it appears from the language of the remaining thirteen State codes that extrinsic force may be required, courts in twelve states have accepted, for example, that the statutory force requirement was met when the defendant only pushed or pinned his victim down or otherwise physically manipulated her; the test for “force” was found to be “whether the act was against the will of [the victim]” (Freeman v. State, 959 S.W.2d 401 (Arkansas 1998)). Thus, “force” was established where the perpetrator “pushed his body weight against [the victim]” and he was “large” or “husky” and the victim “petite” or “small” (State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Connecticut, 1999) and State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kansas, 1997)). The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated: “[A]ny act of sexual penetration ... without the affirmative and freely given permission of the victim ... constitutes the offence of sexual assault. Therefore, physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required