Disturbances Tribunal; Communication 101/93 (Decision ACHPR/101/93) concerned the Legal Practitioners Decree; and Communication 129/94 (ACHPR/129/94) concerned the Constitution (Modification and Suspension) Decree and the Political Parties (Dissolution) Decree. 13. All of the Decrees in question in the above communications contain "ouster" clauses. In the case of the special tribunals, these clauses prevent the ordinary courts from taking up cases placed before the special tribunals or from entertaining any appeals from the decisions of the special tribunals (ACHPR/60/91:23[sic] 1 and ACHPR/87/93:22[sic]2 ). The Legal Practitioners Decree specifies that it cannot be challenged in the courts and that anyone attempting to do so commits a crime (ACHPR/101/93:14 and 15). The Constitution (Modification and Suspension) Decree prohibited their challenge in the Nigerian Courts (ACHPR/129/94:14 and 15). 14. In all of the cases cited above, the Commission found that the ouster clauses render local remedies non-existent, ineffective or illegal. They create a legal situation in which the judiciary can provide no check on the executive branch of government. A few courts in the Lagos district have occasionally found that they have jurisdiction; in 1995 the Court of Appeal in Lagos, relying on common law, found that courts should examine some decrees notwithstanding ouster clauses, where the decree is "offensive and utterly hostile to rationality". 15. In the instant communication, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was ousted and the case against the accused persons was brought before a special tribunal. From this tribunal there is no appeal to the ordinary courts. 16. Thus, as dictated by both the available facts and the precedents of the African Commission, the communication was declared admissible. Merits 17. In all of the above-cited cases, the ouster clauses in addition to being prima facie evidence of admissibility, were found to constitute violations of Article 7. The Commission must take this opportunity, not only to reiterate the conclusions made before, that the constitution and procedures of the special tribunals violate Articles 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(c) and 26, but to recommend an end to the practice of removing entire areas of law from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. 18. In oral statements before the Commission, the Nigerian government has claimed that "as a developing nation, we do not have enough resources to man these law courts very well." (Examination of State Reports, 13th Session, April 1993, Nigeria-Togo, p.35) This was given as a justification of "special" tribunals. Another justification given was that a breakdown of law and order had caused a high volume of cases (Id. pp. 37 and 39). 19. The government denied that there is anything special at all about these extraordinarily constituted courts and maintained that they respected all the procedures of the regular courts; however, the government did concede that they include military officers, and that from the special tribunals there is no means of appeal to the regular courts. 20. Although the government argues that the procedure before special tribunals offers the same protections for rights as the regular courts (See Id. at 38), this assertion is belied by the very reasons the government gives for the tribunals, as well as the evidence submitted by the complainants. 21. The Commission's previous decisions found that the special tribunals violated the Charter because their judges were specially appointed for each case by the executive branch, and would include on the panel at least one, and often a majority, of military or law enforcement officers, in addition to a sitting or retired judge. The Commission here reiterates its previous decisions and declares that the trial of these persons before a special tribunal violates Articles 7(1)(d) and 26. 22. The system of executive confirmation, as opposed to appeal, provided for in the institution of special tribunals, violates Article 7(1)(a). 23. If the domestic courts are overburdened, which the Commission does not doubt, the Commission recommends that the government consider allocating more resources to them. The setting up of a parallel system has the danger of undermining the court system and creates the likelihood of unequal application of the laws. 24. The complainants have alleged that the accused were not permitted to choose their own counsel. This is a question of fact. The government has not responded to this case specifically, neither has it contradicted this accusation. Therefore, in accordance with its established practice, (See the Commission's decisions in 2