2010 and therefore, the Applicant filed his case, “seven (7) years and seven (7) months” later. 45. According to the Respondent State even though the Charter does not set a time limit for seizure of the Court by Applicants, the Court has held that it would determine what is reasonable on a case-by-case basis. The Respondent State argues that the Court should not consider the present Application to have been filed within a reasonable time as the lapse of “seven (7) years and four (7) months��� is unreasonable. 46. The Applicant did not reply specifically to the objection but he avers that the Application is admissible in accordance with Articles 6(1), (2) and 10 of the Protocol. *** 47. The Court notes that Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules which in substance restates the contents of Article 56(6) of the Charter, requires an application to be filed within: “a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seised with the matter.” 48. The Court recalls its jurisprudence, that: “… the reasonableness of the timeframe for seizure depends on the specific circumstances of the case and should be determined on a case-by-case basis.”8 Some of the circumstances that the Court has taken into consideration include: imprisonment, being lay without the benefit of legal assistance,9 indigence, 8 Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso (merits) (28 March 2014) 1 AfCLR 219, § 92. See also Thomas v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 73. 9 Thomas v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 73; Christopher Jonas v. Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 101, § 54; Amir Ramadhani v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (11 May 2018) 2 AfCLR 344, § 83. 12