“The Commission from the memoranda and testimonies before it noted that, while the security forces were quickly deployed to quell the riot in the Northern part of the state, the security forces were not posted to Southern part of the State until the 19th April, 2011.” 110. The inadequate strength of the Police in Kaduna State was also been admitted by the Respondent in the report of its investigation which states on page 17-18 paragraph 15 (iii) of exhibit 26 as: “iii…..The strength of the police formations in Southern Kaduna State which as earlier stated has been a scene of recurring serious civil disturbances and violence over the last 24 years (1987, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2011) is grossly inadequate 111. The defence of the Respondent to this allegation is that their resources were overstretched and that while they were controlling crisis in the Northern Kaduna same also erupted simultaneously in Southern Kaduna which delayed prompt deployment. It is instructive that Exhibit 26 at page 17 paragraph 15 (ii) supra …puts the death in the Kaduna south senatorial district at 85% of the total death in Kaduna State. 112. While there is merit in the defence as it pertains to the fact of existence of simultaneous crisis which overstretched the resources both human and material and negatively impacted on their ability to promptly respond to the later crisis that erupted in Southern Kaduna; That notwithstanding, the Court is of the view that in the light of the history of Southern Kaduna which is volatile in nature and therefore prone to incessant violent unrest, the Respondent ought to have made provisions for a full-fledged police station with well-equipped standby battle ready anti-riot policemen. Though the Respondent were not in a position to have averted the mayhem, their earliest response could have mitigated the losses. The effect of such tardiness was held to be in violation of the obligation of a state when the African Commission held in a post-election crisis thus; “Failure to take adequate measures to prevent the violence which led to the physical harm and material damage suffered by the victims violated Article 4 of the Charter of ACHPR.” See the case of Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Interights v. Cameroun; Communication 272/03, paragraphs 124 – 126. 113. The Court therefore holds that the deployment of security agents on the 19th of April 2011 in response to a crisis that started on the 18th of April 2011 and lasted 31