10 O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 35. The Court finds that the applicants were “substantially affected” by the Notices of Intended Prosecution they received, such that they were “charged” with their respective speeding offences within the autonomous meaning of that term in Article 6 of the Convention (see Serves v. France, 20 October 1997, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI). In any event, Article 6 of the Convention can be applicable to cases of compulsion to give evidence even in the absence of any other proceedings, or where an applicant is acquitted in the underlying proceedings (see Funke v. France, 25 February 1993, §§ 39 and 40, Series A no. 256-A, and Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720/97, §§ 43-45, ECHR 2000-XII). 36. The Court accepts that Article 6 is applicable in the present case. B. Compliance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 1. The parties’ submissions 37. The Government submitted that the privilege against selfincrimination and the right to remain silent were not absolute and their application could be limited by reference to other legitimate aims in the public interest. In addition to the cases on the right to remain silent (see, for example, Saunders v. the United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, § 62, Reports 1996-VI), they referred to the limitations on access to court (see, for example, Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 58, Series A no. 93), to case-law showing that in certain circumstances Contracting States were permitted to reverse the onus of proof of certain matters provided that this did not disturb the fair balance between the interests of the individual and the general interests of the community (see, for example, Salabiaku v. France, 7 October 1988, § 28, Series A no. 141-A), to acceptable limitations on the rights of the defence in cases on equality of arms (see Fitt v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29777/96, § 45, ECHR 2000-II), and the questioning of witnesses (see S.N. v. Sweden, no. 34209/96, § 47, ECHR 2002-V), and also to the general principle that it is primarily for national law to regulate the admissibility of evidence, including incriminating evidence (see, for example, Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 38, ECHR 2000-V). 38. The Government argued that the power under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) to obtain an answer to the question who was driving a car when a suspected motoring offence was committed and to use that answer as evidence in a prosecution or, alternatively, to prosecute a person who failed to provide information was compatible with Article 6. There were very good reasons why the owner should be required to identify the driver: driving offences are intended to deter dangerous conduct which causes risk to the public and deterrence depended on effective enforcement (research showed that speed cameras, etc., had