Privy Council, the requirement to exhaust local remedies has been met. However, the Respondent State has submitted that the Complainant has not exhausted local remedies given that the Victim’s case was not referred to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which could conduct an inquiry and possibly refer the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeal. 55. Therefore, the issues for determination are: whether the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the highest court of the land; and whether the remedy available before the NHRC can be considered a judicial remedy? 56. In this regard, the Commission notes that, as provided in Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, appeals of decisions of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court are referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (the Judicial Committee).7 The Commission notes that Article 81 of the Constitution does not include a provision stating that decisions of the Judicial Committee are final. However the Commission notes that the Complainant submitted that the the Judicial Committee is the highest and final Court in the Republic of Mauritius, and this assertion was not contested by the Respondent State in its submissions on the admissibility of the Communication. 57. From the facts of the case and the information provided, the Commission notes that, following the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Victim appealed to the Judicial Committee; however this appeal was rejected. Accordingly, the facts of the case indicate that the Victim sought remedy from the highest and final Court in the country. 58. Regarding the Respondent State’s submission that the Victim did not exhaust all available local remedies because the case was not referred to the NHRC, the Commission has previously held that human rights commissions do not fall under the category of judicial remedies which should be sought by Victims of human rights violations. In Communication 221/98: Alfred Cudjoe v. Ghana, the Commission held that “the internal remedy to which Article 56(5) refers entails remedy sought from courts of a judicial nature, which the Ghanaian Human Rights Commission is clearly not. From the Commission’s point of view, seizing the said Commission can [be] taken as preliminary amicable settlement and should, in principle, considering the employer’s failure to react, be followed by an action before the law courts.”8 Therefore local remedies which are essentially non-judicial, such as National Human Rights Commissions, are not the kind envisaged in relation to Article 56(5).9 “Judicial Committee” means the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council established by the Judicial Committee Act 1833 of the United Kingdom as form time to time amended by any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom;” Article 111, Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius 8 Communication 221/98: Alfred B. Cudjoe v. Ghana (1999) ACHPR, para 14. See also Communication 313/05: Kenneth Good v. Botswana (2010) ACHPR, para 88 9 Henry Onoria, “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the exhaustion of exhaustion of local remedies under the African Charter,” 3 African Human Rights Law Journal, 2003,Pg.19 7 8