95. The Court recalls that, as it has previously held, in making a general assessment as to whether the right to dignity protected by Article 5 of the Charter has been violated, it considers three main factors. First, Article 5 has no limitation clause. The prohibition of indignity inflicted through cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is thus absolute. Second, prohibition must be interpreted to afford the widest possible protection against abuse, whether physical or psychological. Lastly, personal suffering and indignity can take various forms and their assessment will depend on the circumstances of each case.15 96. The Court further considers that acts of exploitation, degradation, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which violate human dignity must be of a certain level of gravity and must have been carried out to such an extent to cause the victim grave suffering or humiliation, thus bringing them shame.16 The distinction is therefore based on the difference in the intensity of the suffering or the threshold of intolerable suffering intentionally inflicted on the victim.17 97. In the instant case, the Applicants do not demonstrate how the failure to pay them compensation for the loss of their rights brought them humiliation, shame or grave suffering to the extent of breaking their physical or moral resistance. They also do not demonstrate how the alleged death of the family members was linked to the non-payment of the compensation amount awarded them by the courts. 98. The Court therefore finds that the Respondent State did not violate the Applicants’ right to dignity. 15 Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (2019) 3 AfCLR 13, § 88; See also John Modise v. Botswana, Communication No. 97/93 (2000) AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 2000), para 91. 16 Sébastien Germain Ajavon v. Republic of Benin (merits) (2019) 3 AfCLR 136, § 254. See also Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication No. 224/98 (2000) AHRLR 262 (ACHPR) 2000), para 71 24