110. The Court, therefore, finds that the Respondent State violated the Applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment protected under Article 5 of the Charter regarding the length of time spent in pre-trial detention. ii. On the Applicant’s detention in the death row 111. The Applicant avers that the length of his detention after being sentenced to death caused him anxiety and psychological anguish, which constitute a violation of his right. According to the Applicant, the de facto moratorium adopted by the Respondent State does not mitigate the risk of the death row phenomenon as execution may resume at any time, and conditions of detention further compound the associated psychological torture. *** 112. The Court recalls that, as it has held in the earlier cited Rajabu judgment, death row has the inherent potential to cause an adverse impact on an individual’s psychological state due to the fact that the person involved may be executed at any time.30 The Court has taken the view, in several rulings on provisional measures involving the Respondent State, that the existing moratorium does not provide the certainty required to safeguard the right to life when it comes to the death penalty.31 113. The Court also considers the fact that, as at the filing this Application in 2016, the Applicant had been on the death row for at least six (6) years running from his sentencing in 2010. As at the date the present judgment, the Applicant’s time on death row is twelve (12) years, and this landmark should be taken into account given the earlier finding of this Court that the 30 Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), §§ 148-150. See John Lazaro v. United Republic of Tanzania (provisional measures) (18 March 2016) 1 AfCLR 593, §§ 16-18; Evodius Rutechura v. United Republic of Tanzania (provisional measures) (18 March 2016) 1 AfCLR 596, §§ 16-18; Cosma Faustin v. United Republic of Tanzania (provisional measures) (18 March 2016) 1 AfCLR 652, §§ 16-18. 31 30