Meldrum was still within the transitional reprieve period and was, in terms of the Act, allowed to work as a journalist while his application was pending. 70. The Complainants note further that the free practice of the profession of journalism and freedom of expression ought to be interpreted to include freedom to impart and receive information, and this was abrogated by the Respondent State. 71. It is alleged by the Complainants that Mr Meldrum had been charged [with] publication of falsehoods, charges he was acquitted of in the Magistrate’s Court, against which the State never appealed. They state further that the same provision of AIPPA under which Mr Meldrum [was] 4 charged, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Complainants submit that the only way for the Respondent State to deter Mr Meldrum from the free practice of his profession was to physically censor him through an arbitrary act of deportation. 72. The Complainants consider that the response of the State to perceived, real or illicit threats to national security, public order was disproportionate to the threat, if any, posed by the writings of Mr Meldrum. 73. Referring to Article 12.4, the Complainants affirm that non-nationals admitted in any State Party to the Charter should enjoy the same rights entitled to nationals. Thus, according to the Complainants, the expulsion of Mr Meldrum did not satisfy the provisions of the Charter as it was arbitrary in so far as it was improper, disproportionate and contrary to the law and the principles of natural justice. 74. Recalling the restriction on fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the Complainants affirm that the limitations are founded where the drafters of the Charter include clawback provisions such as “in accordance with the law”, “abides by the law”, “within the law” and more clearly stated under Article 27.2. 75. Relying on the principles of necessity and proportionality and referring to international jurisprudence, the Complainants submit that the act of restriction of a right must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations, but must be rationally connected to the objective, and should not impair the right or freedom in question more than is necessary to accomplish a given objective or a pressing social need. 76. Further, the Complainants argue that several international human rights instruments to which Zimbabwe is a party recognise the importance of nondiscrimination in the pursuit and enjoyment of human rights by nationals and non-nationals. The Complainants also submit that the deportation of Mr Meldrum was in violation of Article 26, read together with Article 7 of the Charter. According to the Complainants, Article 7 as has been ruled by the Commission gives meaning to the individual right, whilst Article 26 emphasises on the importance of institutions which give effect to the right in Article 7. 77. The Complainants argue that Mr Meldrum was deported while his case was yet to be heard by the Supreme Court sitting as a constitutional court, thus rendering the right to appeal in this instance illusory. The Complainants submit that the Respondent State, through various organs had defied court orders and allowed such actions to become “acceptable standard of deviation” from enforcing rights guaranteed in the Charter. 78. The Complainants submit that Article 26 of the Charter was violated by pointing to the wanton disregard of court orders by the Respondent State and non-state entities as clear evidence of the nonexistence of the rule of law, principles of natural justice, and presumption of innocence. For the Complainants, these latest principles are elementary indicators of the existence of a proper functioning judiciary, an executive which operates within the law, and a legislature which appreciates the essence of separation of powers. 79. The Complainants argued that the actions of the Respondent State were a violation of Articles 9.1 and 9.2 of the Charter, which provides for freedom of expression, and the right to receive and