inadequate and ineffective. The Respondent State argues that the victim did not exhaust domestic remedies. It argues that, the mere fact that the victim was outside the country could not stop the victim instructing lawyers to approach the courts on his behalf i.e.; the victim did not require or need to be inside the country to access the domestic remedy. The Respondent State submitted further that the victim could have initiated contempt proceedings. 52. The Complainants submitted at length on the non-applicability of Article 56.5 and argued in favour of invoking the principle of constructive exhaustion of local remedies. In summary, they submit that the disregard by the Respondent State of various court orders prior to, and coupled with, the deportation of the victim, denied him the opportunity to exhaust local remedies. Secondly they submit that there were no domestic remedies to exhaust, since the judicial remedies had proved ineffective. The appeal to the Minister was a non-judicial remedy, for purposes of addressing human rights violation. Such a remedy does not fall within the scope of Article 56.5, it failed to comply with rules of natural justice. In any case it was the Minister who had ordered the deportation, thus he could not be expected to proffer any remedy to the victim. 53. The Commission agrees with the Complainants’ arguments. The Commission is of the firm view that immigration officials of the Respondent State had no basis in law to disregard court orders. The Complainants referred the Commission to the Cordinez Cruz [sic] decision, on constructive exhaustion of local remedies. The Commission has looked at the decision in terms of Article 60 of the Charter and finds it very persuasive. The Commission has previously applied this principle too, where the Complainant or victim is impeded from exhaustion of domestic remedies through the conduct of the Respondent State. 54. The deportation of the victim in the case under consideration had been effected in the face of several High Court orders, the Commission finds that to require the victim to pursue further judicial remedies, when all efforts at seeking judicial remedies had been frustrated and ignored by the Respondent State, would have amounted to a “senseless formality” in the true meaning of the words. The remedy which would have granted protection to Mr Meldrum, namely the application pending in the Supreme Court, was considered by the Respondent State’s immigration officials, as “trivial” and of no legal consequence. The Respondent State had notice of the pending application in the Supreme Court, and yet effected the deportation. It actively participated in impeding the victim from accessing the remedy. 55. The Commission therefore holds that the conduct of the Respondent State brings this communication within the scope of constructive exhaustion of remedies principle. By accepting the applicability of the principle of constructive exhaustion of domestic remedies in this case, the Commission distinguishes this case from its decision in communication 219/98 Legal Defence 2 Centre/The Gambia in which it declared the communication inadmissible for failure by a deportee to exhaust local remedies, since the circumstances were not similar. 56. The decision in the Legal Defence Centre is distinguishable because in that case, no effort was made to exhaust domestic remedies. In the case under consideration, the Respondent State was actively engaged in frustrating the restraint orders obtained from the domestic court. The Commission is aware that its decisions on admissibility must be based on the criteria under Article 56, it must however reiterate that States Parties are obliged to respect their obligation to guarantee the independence of the judiciary under Article 26 of the Charter. It is the view of the Commission that Article 56.5 must be read in the context of the Article 26 of the Charter. A State which ignores its duty to guarantee an independent judiciary fails to provide effective remedies to human rights violations, and thereby undermines the protection of human rights under the Charter. 57. On these grounds, the African Commission declares the communication admissible.