(b) the way in which it was administered in regard to himself and his property, are consistent with all the requirements of the Constitution, and to request that if necessary this should be referred to the Supreme Court". It was further contended on behalf of the Applicant in paragraphs 16 and 17 as follows: "16 The Supreme Court is not the sole court that must have regard to the Constitution, but if any party requests that a question concerning the Bill of Rights be referred there by a lower court, the lower court must refer it unless the request is frivolous and vexatious. 17 Section 3 of the Constitution is totally explicit. It states that any law inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution is void, and not merely voidable, and that prevents any court from enforcing it". After considering the issues before it, the learned Judge of the High Court granted the application, but concerning the constitutionality of section 38, it had this to say: "What one has to consider as I said earlier on is the issue of whether or not the property was adequately advertised. If the property was adequately advertised, then in my view no issue would arise as the Supreme Court of this country has already decided on the issues touching the AFC sales".[[/i]] What the High Court was saying here is that there would be no point in referring the question of the constitutionality of section 38 of the Act to the Supreme Court because that Court has already resolved the issue in its earlier decisions. One such case in which the Supreme Court made the position very clear is that of Augustine Runesu Chizikani v Agricultural Finance Corporation Civil Appeal No. 567/94, in which it stated, per Gubbay, C.J., as he then was, as follows: "The Appellant has overlooked the recent judgment of this court in the case of Nyamukusa v Agricultural Finance Corporation SC 174/94 which conclusively affirms the correctness of the decision of the court a quo. In that case the Court, after citing section 4(1), section 40(2) and section 40(2a) of the Act, went on to hold as follows: It is noted that he (the Appellant) was signatory to the agreement which gave powers to the Respondent to act in the manner it did. My reading of section 40(2) and (2a) is that provided there is a stipulation in the loan agreement, to the effect that the Respondent can take possession of the property hypothecated without recourse to law, the Respondent is perfectly entitled to proceed either under section 40(1) or (2) and (2a) of the Act. For obvious advantageous reasons it chose to proceed in terms of the latter subsection in which it is supported by clause 6 of the loan agreement." This position has been maintained in all subsequent cases which include the cases of Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe v (1) Luke Manyandu Thembani and Others (SC 39/07). Such is the background of the present case. 2. Exhaustion of Local Remedies On April 23, 2009, when the hearing of the application was called on, the Respondent sought leave to file its defence to the claim. The Tribunal allowed it to do so, albeit reluctantly, within 7 days from that date and directed the parties to ensure that the pleadings were settled well before June 04, 2009, the date to which the hearing of the case was postponed. The Respondent did not file the defence within the period allowed. But on May 29, 2009, the Respondent brought an application to file a supplementary affidavit by which it sought to adduce further evidence and to contend that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the application which was before it. Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure of SADC Tribunal (the Rules) is about closure of pleadings. It stipulates that pleadings shall close after the completion of written proceedings. By fixing a period within which the Respondent was to have filed the defence, the Tribunal, by necessary inference, also fixed the date by which pleadings were to close, namely, April 30, 2009, the date by which the defence was to be filed. 3