24. With regard to the first objection, the Court recalls its established jurisprudence that it is not an appellate body with respect to decisions of national courts.8 However, “this does not preclude it from examining relevant proceedings in the national courts in order to determine whether they are in accordance with the standards set out in the Charter or any other human rights instruments ratified by the State concerned”.9 The Court would, therefore, not be sitting as an appellate court if it were to consider the Applicant’s allegations. Accordingly, the Court, dismisses this objection and holds that it has jurisdiction to hear the instant Application. 25. With regard to the second objection, the Court notes that the Respondent State’s objection concerns the claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant an order for release. In this regard, the Court recalls Article 27(1) of the Protocol which provides that “[i]f the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to grant different types of reparations, including release from prison, provided that the alleged violation has been established.10 26. For these reasons, the Court dismisses the objections raised by the Respondent State and holds that it has material jurisdiction in this Application. 8 Ernest Francis Mtingwi v. Republic of Malawi (jurisdiction) (15 March 2013) 1 AfCLR 190, § 14. Kennedy Ivan v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (28 March 2019) 3 AfCLR 48, § 26; Guéhi v. Tanzania, supra, § 33. 10 Rajabu Yusuph v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 036/2017, Ruling of 24 March 2022 (admissibility), § 27. 9 9