138. In the present Communication, having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, the Commission reckons that one of the critical issues between the parties is whether at all the Complainant was ever at Camp Lamonnier or anywhere in Djibouti as alleged by the Complainant. 139. In line with the Commission’s viewsin Communication 306/05 - Samuel T. Muzerengwa & 110 Others v Zimbabwe17 the Commission wishes to state for purposes of the present Communication that even though the question whether the alleged violations were committed by Djiboutian state agents or those of the U.S. Government would have to be considered at the merit stage, it is necessary to establish at the admissibility stage that the Complainant was in the territorial jurisdiction or under the effective control of the Republic of Djibouti as he alleges. 140. Notably, the standard of proof required at this stage was subject of much contestation between the parties. The Complainant maintained that the standard of proof is lower at admissibility stage, and higher at the merits stage. The Respondent State on the other hand maintained that the standard is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 141. The Commission wishes to observe first, that the term ‘standard of proof’ is used to ‘mark a point somewhere along the line between a mere conjecture at one end, and the absolute certainty at the other’ that an alleged fact is valid. Proof furnished in support of a given factual allegation must meet or surpass this point for the factual allegation to be found as proven.18 At law such a point on the continuum between the two ends is denoted by different terminology such as ‘on the balance of probabilities’, ‘on a preponderance of evidence’, ‘clear and convincing evidence’, ‘sufficiently substantiated’, ‘with the necessary degree of precision and certainty,’ ‘with certainty’, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, and ‘probable cause’.19 142. Pitching the appropriate standard of proof is germane to the validity of the conclusion to be derived. The above terminologies for standards of proof are adopted for various purposes and in respect of different subject matter and in a variety of circumstances. Ibid K. Del Mar, ‘The International Court of Justice and Standards of Proof’, in: Bannelier, Chistakis, Heathcote (eds), The ICJ and the Development of International law. The Lasting Impact of the Corfu Channel case (Routledge, 2011), cited in Steven Wilkinson, ‘Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding and Inquiry Missions’ (2013) Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights <http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/reports/Standards%20of%20proo%20report.pdf> p. 12-13 (accessed 5 February 2014) 19 For an overview of standards applied by the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights see Steven Wilkinson, ‘Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding Inquiry Missions’ n 18 above, pp. 19-20 17 18 27