only those persons in the civil service, they have suffered discrimination which compromises their right to participate in electoral processes. * 119. On its part, the Respondent State concedes that sections 6(1), on the one hand, and sections 7(1), 7(2) and 7(3) do provide for a differentiated treatment. It is argued, however, that the differentiated treatment is reasonable and justified. In the case of the Director of Elections, the Respondent State submits that “the appointment of a civil servant as Director of Elections is for common interests as it is easy to ascertain his ethical, professional and educational background since public service is governed by well-established legal framework.” As for the returning officers, the Respondent State submits that the differentiation is justified because “the National Electoral Commission do not have branch offices at constituency level hence the use of the Directors as returning officers since they have enough office facilities and expertise in electoral management.” *** 120. The Court notes that Article 2 of the Charter provides as follows: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune birth or any status. 121. As the Court has previously noted, Article 2 of the Charter is imperative for the respect and enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms protected in the Charter.35 Under Article 2, all forms of differentiation on the grounds listed therein is prohibited. Importantly, however, differentiation or distinction on any other basis that does not have objective and reasonable justification, in 35 ACHPR v. Kenya, supra, § 137. 33