82. The Complainants in the present Communication argue that it has satisfied the admissibility conditions set out in Article 56 of the Charter and as such, the Communication should be declared admissible. The Respondent State on its part submits that the Communication should be declared inadmissible because, according to the State, the Complainants have not complied with Articles 56.3, 56.5 and 56.6 of the African Charter. 83. Article 56.3 of the Charter requires that Communications submitted to the African Commission are not written indisparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organisation of African Unity (or African Union). 84. In the present communication, the Respondent State argues that the Communication is written in a language insulting to the judiciary of the State. The State avers that the Complainants published an issue of its Newspaper (The Daily News) on 12 September 2003 in which it stated inter alia that “…the handing down of the judgment marked a sad day for Zimbabwe’s constitutional history. I suppose we should be immensely thankful that we are not prisoners on death row because the practical effect of this judgment is that had we have been challenging the death penalty and not AIPPA, we would have had to hang first and challenge the penalty from hell”. According to the State, this statement shows the contempt that the Complainants have for the Supreme Court. 85. The State claims further that by stating in the communication that a Judge of the Supreme Court Judge Sandura, wasomitted from the case Complainants were insinuating that the composition of the Supreme Court was manipulated. The State claims that the use of the word “omitted” in the communication clearly connotes a motive by the Chief Justice, who selects judges to sit on a case, to have excluded Judge Sandura and that there is bias in the appointment of judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court because they are appointed by the President, and that that the Supreme Court was biased towards the government and therefore acted not as the judiciary but as a political agent of the Government. 86. In response to the State’s allegation of disparaging language, the Complainants refuted the allegation and noted that the language was necessary in that it sought to describe the effect of the judgment on the Complainants. The Complainants also described a number of situations in which it claims the Respondent State itself had made “uncharitable remarks against the same judiciary…” which they consider as insulting and disparaging and far removed from the “criticism that is contained in the Complainants’ brief” which according to them “are aimed at showing the absence of a local remedy in the light of the decision by the Supreme Court”. 87. The fundamental question that has to be addressed in the present communication is how far one can go in criticising a judge or the judiciary in the name of free expression, and whether the statement made by the Complainants constitutesinsulting or disparaging language within the meaning of Article 56.3 of the African Charter. Indeed, the communication invites the Commission to clarify the ostensible relationship between freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of the judiciary and the judicial process. 88. The operative words in Article 56.3 are disparaging and insulting and these words must be directed against the State Party concerned or its institutions or the African Union. According to the Oxford Advanced Dictionary, disparaging means to speak slightingly of… or to belittle…. and insulting means to abuse scornfully or to offend the self respect or modesty of… 89. The judiciary is a very important institution in every country and cannot function properly without the support and trust of the public. Judges, by the very nature of the profession, speak in courts and courts only. They are not at liberty to debate or even defend their decisions in public. This manner of conducting the business of the courts is intended to enhance public confidence. In the final analysis, it is the people who have to believe in the integrity of their judges. Without such trust, the judiciary cannot function properly, and where the judiciary cannot function properly the rule of law must die. Because of the importance of preserving public trust in the judiciary and because of the reticence required for it to perform its arbitral role, special safeguards have been in existence for many centuries to protect the judiciary against vilification. One such protective device is to deter insulting or disparaging remarks or language calculated to bring the judicial process into ridicule and disrepute.