114 the act must “not be done for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator”. 315 These two concepts, neither of which is a prerequisite for criminal culpability under Article 5 of the Statute, are, in any case, not coextensive. It may be true that if the act is related to the armed conflict, then it is not being committed for purely personal motives. But it does not follow from this that, if the act is unrelated to the armed conflict, it is being committed for purely personal reasons. The act may be intimately related to the attack on a civilian population, that is, it may fit precisely into a context of persecution of a particular group, and yet be unrelated to the armed conflict. It would be wrong to conclude in these circumstances that, since the act is unrelated to the armed conflict, it is being committed for purely personal reasons. The converse is also true; that is, merely because personal motivations can be identified in the defendant’s carrying out of an act, it does not necessarily follow that the required nexus with the attack on a civilian population must also inevitably be lacking. 2. The Object and Purpose of the Statute 253. The Prosecution has submitted that “the object and purpose of the Statute support the interpretation that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons”. The Prosecution cites the Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction, to the effect that “the ‘primary purpose’ of the establishment of the International Tribunal ‘is not to leave unpunished any person guilty of [a] serious violation [of international humanitarian law], whatever the context within which it may have been committed’”. 316 This begs the question, however, whether a crime committed for purely personal reasons is a crime against humanity, and therefore a serious violation of international humanitarian law under Article 5 of the Statute. 254. The Appeals Chamber would also reject the Prosecution’s submission concerning the onerous evidentiary burden which would be imposed on it in having to prove that the accused did not act from personal motives, 317 as equally question-begging and inapposite. It is question-begging because if, arguendo, under international criminal law, the fact that 315 Ibid. Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.20. 317 Ibid., para. 4.23. 316 Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999