70 Herzegovina over the course of the conflict, the Dayton-Paris Accord provides a particular insight into the political, strategic and military realities which prevailed in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 1995, and including May 1992. The fact that from 4 August 1994 the FRY appeared to cut off its support to the Republika Srpska because the leadership of the former had misgivings about the authorities in the latter is not insignificant. 198 Indeed, this “delinking” served to emphasise the high degree of overall control exercised over the Republika Srpska by the FRY, for, soon after this cessation of support from the FRY, the Republika Srpska realised that it had little choice but to succumb to the authority of the FRY.199 Thus, the Dayton-Paris Accord may indirectly shed light upon the realities of the command and control structure that existed over the Bosnian Serb army at the time the VRS and the VJ were ostensibly delinked, and may also assist the evaluation of whether or not control continued to be exercised over the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY army thereafter. 158. The Appeals Chamber will now turn to examine the specific features of the Dayton Accord that are of relevance to this inquiry. 159. By an agreement concluded on 29 August 1995 between the FRY and the Republika Srpska and referred to in the preamble of the Dayton-Paris Accord, it was provided that a unified delegation would negotiate at Dayton. This delegation would consist of six persons, three from the FRY and three from the Republika Srpska. The Delegation was to be chaired 198 See Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of operations of an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), S/1994/1074, 19 September 1996, p. 3, where it is noted that as of 4 August 1994, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ordered, inter alia, the breaking off of political and economic relations with the Republika Srpska and the closure of the border between the Republika Srpska and the FRY to all transport towards the Republika Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine. International observers were deployed to monitor compliance with these measures, and it was reported by the Co-Chairmen that the Government of the FRY appeared to be “meeting its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces.” (Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), S/1994/1124, 3 October 1994, pp. 2-3). 199 As outlined below, this process culminated in the agreement of the Republika Srpska to be represented at the Dayton conference by the FRY (below, at paragraph 159). This appears to have been in spite of intense opposition, within the Republika Srpska, to the peace settlements proposed by the international community, as is evidenced by the overwhelming rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the international community’s peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in a referendum which took place in Bosnian Serb-held territory on 27 – 28 August 1994 (See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UNGAOR, 49th sess., supp. no. 1 (A/49/1), 2 September 1994, p. 95). Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999