119 defence which has as its premise “non-official acts”. The question whether an accused acted for purely personal reasons can only arise where the accused can claim to have acted as a private individual in a private or non-official capacity. This is why the issue arises mainly in denunciation cases, where one neighbour or relative denounces another. This paradigm is, however, inapplicable to trials of Nazi ministers, judges or other officials of the State, particularly where they have not raised such a defence by admitting the acts in question whilst claiming that they acted for personal reasons. Any plea that an act was done for “purely personal” motives and that it therefore cannot constitute a crime against humanity is pre-eminently for the defence to raise and one would not expect the court to rule on the issue proprio motu and as obiter dictum. 264. The two sections of the Ministries case, referred to by the Prosecution, 327 are also not strictly relevant, as those sections re-state the law of complicity – “[…] he who participates or plays a consenting part therein is guilty of a crime against humanity” – rather than dealing with the importance or otherwise of whether the accused acted from personal motives. Equally, in the Justice case, 328 the defendants do not appear to have raised the defence that they acted for personal motives. 265. The Prosecution also refers to the Eichmann and Finta cases. The Eichmann case is inappropriate as the defendant in that case specifically denied that he ever acted from a personal motive, claiming that he did what he did “not of his own volition but as one of numerous links in the chain of command”. 329 Moreover the court found Eichmann, who was the Head of the Jewish Affairs and Evacuation Department and one of the persons who attended the infamous Wannsee Conference, to be “no mere ‘cog’, small or large, in a machine propelled by others; he was, himself, one of those who propelled the machine”. 330 Such a senior official would not be one to whom the “purely personal reasons” consideration could conceivably apply. 327 U.S. v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951, vol XIV, pp. 611, 470-471, cited in Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.15. 328 U.S. v. Altstoetter et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951, vol. III. 329 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports 1968, p. 323. 330 Ibid., p. 331. Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999