115 the accused did not act from purely personal motives was a requirement of crimes against humanity, then the Prosecution would have to prove that element, whether it was onerous for it to do so or not. The question is simply whether or not there is such a requirement under international criminal law. 3. Case-law as Evidence of Customary International Law 255. Turning to the further submission of the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber agrees that the weight of authority supports the proposition that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons, provided it is understood that the two aforementioned conditions – that the crimes must be committed in the context of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his acts, in the words of the Trial Chamber, “fitted into such a pattern” – are met. 256. In this regard, it is necessary to review the case-law cited by the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution, as well as other relevant case law, to establish whether this case-law is indicative of the emergence of a norm of customary international law on this matter. 257. The Prosecution is correct in stating that the 1948 case cited by the Trial Chamber 318 supports rather than negates the proposition that crimes against humanity may be committed for purely personal motives, provided that the acts in question were knowingly committed as “part and parcel of all the mass crimes committed during the persecution of the Jews”. As the Supreme Court for the British Zone stated, “in cases of crimes against humanity taking the form of political denunciations, only the perpetrator’s consciousness and intent to 318 Decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Criminal Chamber) (9 November 1948), S. StS 78/48, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen vol. II, pp. 498-499. The Accused, Mrs. K. and P., had denounced P’s Jewish wife to the Gestapo for her anti-Nazi remarks. The defendants’ sole purpose was to rid themselves of Mrs. P., who would not agree to a divorce, and the Accused saw no other means of so doing than by delivering Mrs. P. to the Gestapo. Upon her denunciation, Mrs. P. was arrested and brought to Auschwitz concentration camp where she died after a few months due to malnutrition. The Court of First Instance convicted K. and P. of crimes against humanity. (See Decision of Schwurgericht Hamburg from 11 May 1948, (50). 17/48, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. II, pp. 491-497). The Accused appealed to the Supreme Court of the British Zone which dismissed their appeal and confirmed their convictions, stating that both the physical and the mental elements of a crime against humanity were met. (See Decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone from 9 November 1948, S. StS 78/48, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. II, pp. 498-499 at p. 499). According to the Supreme Court, the findings of the Court of First Instance had sufficiently proved that the accused fulfilled this mental requirement. Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999