99 take part in a joint criminal enterprise and to further – individually and jointly – the criminal purposes of that enterprise; and (ii) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of the group of offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal purpose. Hence, the participants must have had in mind the intent, for instance, to ill-treat prisoners of war (even if such a plan arose extemporaneously) and one or some members of the group must have actually killed them. In order for responsibility for the deaths to be imputable to the others, however, everyone in the group must have been able to predict this result. It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also called “advertent recklessness” in some national legal systems). 221. In addition to the aforementioned case law, the notion of common plan has been upheld in at least two international treaties. The first of these is the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 52/164 of 15 December 1997 and opened for signature on 9 January 1998. Pursuant to Article 2(3)(c) of the Convention, offences envisaged in the Convention may be committed by any person who: [i]n any other way [other than participating as an accomplice, or organising or directing others to commit an offence] contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraphs 1 or 2 of the present article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned. The negotiating process does not shed any light on the reasons behind the adoption of this text. 279 This Convention would seem to be significant because it upholds the notion of a holding that for the accused to be found guilty, it was necessary that he had not only foreseen but also willed the killing (see text of the judgement in Giustizia penale, 1949, Part II, cols. 740-742). 279 The Report of the Sixth Committee (25 November 1997, A/52/653) and the Official Records of the General Assembly session in which this Convention was adopted made scant reference to Article 2 and did not nd elaborate upon the doctrine of common purpose (see UNGAOR, 72 plenary meeting, 52nd sess., Mon. 15 December 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.72). The Japanese delegate during the 33rd meeting of the Sixth Committee nevertheless noted that “some terms used ?in the Conventiong such as […] ‘such contribution’ (Article 2, para. 3(c)) were ambiguous” (33rd Meeting of the Sixth Committee, 2 December 1997, UNGAOR A/C.6/52/SR.33, p. 8, para. 77). He concluded that his Government would therefore “interpret 'such contribution’ […] to mean abetment, assistance or other similar acts as defined by Japanese legislation” (ibid). Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999