domestic judicial competence of the Republic of Mali, and that in that respect, the Court recalls its consistently held case law and declines jurisdiction on any application brought seeking to overturn decisions of the domestic courts of Member States …” (§38). Then in Case Concerning Barthélémy Diaz v. Republic of Senegal (Judgment of 23 March 2012), the Court recalls in paragraph 25, regarding a committal order by a judge, that all the concepts at stake called for a closer look to be taken at the facts of the case, in relation to the individuals indicted, and therefore fell exclusively within the ambit of the domestic courts; as contrasted with the jurisdiction of the Community Court, when seised with a matter on human rights, and instituted against a Member State of the Community. Finally, in the case law of Aziagbede Kokou and Others v. Republic of Togo (Judgment of 3 July 2013), the Court finds that: “… it is not within its human rights protection mandate to substitute its own viewpoint on the facts of a case for that of the domestic courts seised with the same case, in terms of determining the authenticity of certain exhibits pleaded in relation to charges of a criminal nature. The issue would have been completely different if the question before the Court were to be limited to determining the fairness of the entire procedure which may have been employed at the national level.” The Court concludes that it is impossible for it to make a pronouncement on the disputed recorded telephone conversations, given the failure to demonstrate a direct effect of the said recordings on the procedure. The Court therefore dismisses the claims made by the Applicant in that regard. AS TO THE APPLICANT’S REQUESTS FOR RELIEF The Applicant equally requested the Court to award him the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Million CFA Francs (CFA F 150,000,000) “in legal fees and honorariums”. The Court is however of the view that any request for monetary compensation shall be buttressed by adequate proof, and must be as a result of a physical or psychological harm suffered by an applicant. In the instant case, the Court has rectified the procedural aberration amounting to human rights violation, which consisted of putting impediments in the way of Applicant in the exercise of his right to free choice of counsel. The Applicant’s counsel can now fully exercise the mandate of representing him, for the purposes of putting up his defence. There is no apparent link between the violation of that right – which has been restored – and the request for monetary compensation. As things stand, the 16