4 GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT death. They sum up the priorities of the law-enforcement agencies as follows: establishing a line of defence within the red zone, with the task of repelling rapidly any attempt to break through; establishing a line of defence within the yellow zone to deal with any incidents, taking account of the position of the demonstrators in various locations and of actions perpetrated by more extremist elements; putting in place public-order measures on the streets concerned by the demonstrations, bearing in mind the risk of violence encouraged by the presence of crowds of people. 14. The parties agreed as to the fact that the service instructions of 19 July 2001 amended the plans hitherto established regarding the deployment of the available means and resources, in order to enable the law-enforcement agencies to counter effectively any attempt to enter the red zone by participants in the demonstration of the Tute Bianche (“White overalls”) which had been announced and authorised for the following day. 15. The applicants maintained that the service instructions of 19 July had given a detachment of carabinieri implicated in the death of Carlo Giuliani a dynamic role, whereas it had previously been supposed to remain in one location. The Government stated that the service instructions had been communicated orally to the officers on the ground. 16. A radio communications system had been put in place, with an operations control room located in the Genoa police headquarters (questura), which was in radio contact with the officers on the ground. The carabinieri and police officers could not communicate directly amongst themselves by radio; they could only contact the control room. 17. On the morning of 20 July some groups of particularly aggressive demonstrators, wearing balaclavas and masks (the “Black Bloc”) sparked numerous incidents and clashes with law-enforcement officers. The Tute Bianche march was due to set off from the Carlini stadium. This was a demonstration involving several organisations: representatives of the “No Global” movement and of community centres, and young communists from the Rifondazione comunista party. While they believed in non-violent protest (civil disobedience), they had announced a strategic objective, namely to try to penetrate the red zone. On 19 July 2001 the head of the Genoa police authority (questore) had prohibited the Tute Bianche march from entering the red zone or the zone adjacent to it, and had deployed law-enforcement officers to halt the march at Piazza Verdi. Consequently, the demonstrators were able to march from the Carlini stadium and all the way along Via Tolemaide to Piazza Verdi, that is to say, well beyond the junction of Via Tolemaide and Corso Torino where clashes occurred, as detailed below. 18. At around 1.30 p.m. the march set off and headed slowly westwards. Around Via Tolemaide there were signs of earlier disturbances. The march was headed by a contact group made up of politicians and a group of journalists carrying video recorders and cameras. The marchers slowed