"The African lnstitute of lnternational Law notes that the link between democracy and human rights is established by several international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21(3), (. ) The Institute further maintains that the African Charter on Democracy is a human rights instrument in that it confers rights and freedoms on individuals. According to the lnstitute, the Charter explains, interprets and gives effect to the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter on Human Rights, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action (1999), the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa5 and the 2003 Kigali Declaration". 36. The Conclusion on jurisdiction that follows from this suite of instruments in § 65 is suggestive. "The Court concludes that the African Charter on Democracy and the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy are human rights instruments, within the meaning of Article 3 of the Protocol, and that it is therefore competent to interpret and apply them." 37.|t follows that the Court in its first decade uses Article 3(1) to determine its jurisdiction as set out in the Protocol. As in established judicial practice, the Court uses the applicable law recognized by the "States concerned" to extend or further establish its jurisdiction. ln this case, it makes use of Article 7 of the Protocol. The question of priority between the two Articles does not arise, as il is a matter of the particular case and of the choice made by the Court. The two Articles are equally involved in the general question of the Court's jurisdiction to hear cases. 38.1n its judgment in Jonas (2017), at paragraphs 28,29 and 30, the Court goes beyond Article 3 on its own motion, stating that. "Article 3 of the Protocol does not give the Court the latrtude to decide on lhe issues raised by the Applicant before the domestic courts, to review the judgments of those courts, to assess the evidence and to reach a conclusion", §25 13