18 TSALIKIDIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT X. v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 4473/14, § 40, 12 May 2015). It is insufficient for an applicant to allege relevant new information where he or she has merely sought to support his or her past complaints with new legal argument (see, for example, I.J.L. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 39029/97, 6 July 1999 and Kafkaris (dec.), cited above, § 68). In order for the Court to consider an application which relates to the same facts as a previous application, the applicant must genuinely advance a new complaint or submit new information which has not previously been considered by the Court, within the six-month time-limit set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Lowe (dec.) and Kafkaris (dec.), § 68, both cited above). 58. In view of the above considerations concerning the applicants’ failure to comply with the six-month rule, the Court will consider the objection of admissibility under Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention only with regard to the supplementary investigation. In this respect, it is sufficient to say that the supplementary investigation took place between 2012 and 2014, that is long after application no. 13207/07 had been lodged with the Court, and, therefore, that part of the application does not refer to the same facts as the previous one. 59. It follows that the Government’s objection should be dismissed in so far as the supplementary investigation is concerned. (c) Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies 60. The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants first to use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Article 35 § 1 also requires that the complaints which it is intended subsequently to bring before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance, and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law, but that no recourse should have been had to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 51-52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, §§ 65-67, Reports 1996-IV). 61. The Court emphasises that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, § 224, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It has recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to take into account the circumstances of the individual case. This means, in particular, that the Court must take realistic account not only