00030? it was in the instant case of Shulcrani and others, with the question raised by the conditions of use of the "presidential prerogative of mercy". IL Presidential prerogative of merqt, applicable law 7. In aclear statement, the Court goes on to state that: "in so far aslit relates to all the Applicants and their allegation of a violation of their rights due to the exercise of the presidential prerogative of mercy, it is inadmissible for failure to fulfil the requirement under Article 56(5) of the Charter which is restated in Rule a0(5) of the Rules".ra Thus, admissibility conditions being cumulative, consideration of the elements drawn from the presidential pardon was superfluous. 8. This power to annul a sentence, or even the annulment of a prosecution procedure, is conferred on the highest political authority in the country. It is a monarchical "snub", and even an infringement on the law, against the power of the judiciary. This power of mercy exists in almost all democratic systems.l5 In the instant case, the Applicants are not disputing the basis, but "primarily alleging a violation of their rights to equality and non-discrimination by reason of the exercise of the presidential prerogative of mercy".r6 The arguments used by the Applicants were even more explicit. They stated that o'the Respondent State treats prisoners convicted of comrption and other economic crimes lightly and favourably compared to other prisoners since they can access the presidential pardon twice, a condition which is not afforded to other convicts. The Applicants contend that this violates Article 3(l) and (2) of the Charter, and Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...". The Applicants were thus denouncing an allegedly arbitrary exercise of the presidential pardon. In the instant case, did this Court need to hear it? 9. The intemational justiciability of the discretionary acts of Heads of State remains debatable.17 The application of intemational law, including human rights law, is essentially based on a principle that dates back as far as the 1927 Lotusts case, namely: "all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which intemational law places upon 14 AfCIIPR, Judgement, Shukrani Masegenya Mango and others v. Tanzania, op. cit.,$ 54. Laffaille (F.), Droit de grdce et powoirs propres du chef de t'Etat en ltalie, Reyue internarionale de droit compard, [Right of Pardon and Powers of the Head of State in Italy], International Journal of Comparatite Law, flight. 59, 2007, pp. 761 to 804. 16 See AfCIIPR, Judgement, Shukrani Masegenya Mango and others y. Tanzania, op. cit., S 48. 17 Cosnard (M.), ( Les immunit€s du chef d'Etat >, SFDI, Ze chef d'Etat er le droit international. Colloque de Clermont" [Immunities of the Head of State", SFDI, Head of State and International Law. Clermont Conference (June 2 00 I ), Paris, Pedone, 2002, p. 201. 18 See PCIJ, the "Lotus" case, France, Judgement of7 September 1927, Series A, No. 10, p. 19. See 15 4