3 media, as essential instruments of freedom of thought and expression, are required to discharge their social function responsibly.”2 10. In this judgment, the Court has noted the need to protect the human rights of those who “face the power of the media” (para. 57). It has further established that the State “must not only minimize restrictions on the dissemination of information, but also extend equity rules, to the greatest possible extent, to the participation in the public debate of different types of information, fostering informative pluralism” (para. 57). 11. This is an issue of increasing relevance in societies where at times the rights of individuals are violated by the factual power of the media in an asymmetric context which, as stated in the judgment, the State must seek to balance. As clearly established in the judgment, in order for the State to be able to exercise its right to ensure the right to have one’s honor protected, in a democratic society the mechanisms provided by the administration of justice –including criminal responsibility- may be used within the appropriate framework of proportionality and reasonability and the respect for the whole set of human rights prevailing in a democratic society. 12. When opinions on public officials or persons who stand in a position of public relevance are expressed through the media, the former, for the sake of the legitimate general interest at stake, must tolerate some degree of risk that their subjective rights may be impaired by such statements or opinions. Along these lines, this judgment has reiterated what has been stated in prior cases,3 in that “the opinions regarding a person’s qualification to hold office or the actions of public officials in the performance of their duties are afforded greater protection, so that debate in a democratic system is encouraged” (para. 86). 13. Notwithstanding, the Court has ruled that the right of all individuals to have their honor respected is protected and that public officials are “under the protection afforded by Article 11 of the Convention, which enshrines the right to have one’s honor respected” (para. 71), as “under the provisions of the Convention, the protection of a person’s honor and reputation is a legitimate end” (para. 71). This different threshold of protection does neither amount to a lack of limitations for those who work in the media nor to a lack of rights for said public officials. The right to have one’s honor respected is one and indivisible and may be asserted by all individuals, which is why the exercise of freedom of thought and expression does not allow for injurious, degrading or humiliating expressions or insidious insinuations. 14. Accordingly, all individuals –among them journalists-, are subject to the liability that may result from the impairment of the rights of others. Anyone who injures the fundamental rights of others, whether a journalist or not, must assume his responsibility. In turn, the State, must ensure that all individuals, whether journalists or not, respect the rights of others, limiting any conduct which may result in their impairment. 2 3 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 1, para. 117. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 98 and Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 1, para. 128.