21 false, nor can they justify in and of themselves a restriction on freedom of thought and expression, inasmuch as it is everyone’s right to give his free opinion on issues of public interest and on the performance of the duties of a judge regarding a matter of great public concern.” 83. In this last step of the examination, it is discussed whether the restriction is strictly proportionate, in a manner such that the sacrifice inherent therein is not exaggerated or disproportionate in relation to the advantages obtained from the adoption of such limitation.58 The Court has adopted this method in pointing out that: in order for restrictions to be in conformity with the provisions of the Convention, they must be justified in terms of collective purposes which, owing to their relevance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the rights enshrined by Article 13 of the Convention and do not limit the right established in said article more than is strictly necessary. In other words, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression.59 84. In the case in point, the restriction should serve the purpose of ensuring the full exercise of the right to have one’s reputation respected without rendering nugatory the right to criticize the actions of public officials in the performance of their duties. In order to examine this, it is necessary to analyze i) the degree of impairment of one of the rights at stake, establishing whether the extent of such impairment was serious, limited, or moderate; ii) the relevance of the satisfaction of the opposing right, and iii) whether the satisfaction of the latter justifies the restriction of the former. In some cases the balance will be tilted to the prevalence of freedom of thought and expression, while in others it will be tilted to safeguarding the right to have one’s honor respected. 85. Regarding the degree of impairment of the right to freedom of thought and expression, the Court deems that that effects of the criminal proceedings in themselves, the application of a sanction, Mr. Kimel’s addition to the criminal offenders registry, the latent risk for him to be deprived of his liberty, and the stigmatizing effect of the criminal sentence imposed thereon show that the subsequent liability imposed on Mr. Kimel was serious. Even the fine constitutes in and of itself a serious impairment of the right to freedom of thought and expression, given the considerable amount set in relation to the beneficiary’s income.60 86. Regarding the right to have one’s honor respected, the opinions regarding a person’s qualification to hold office or the actions of public officials in the performance of their duties are afforded greater protection, so that debate in a democratic system is encouraged.61 The Court has pointed out that in a democratic society political and public personalities are more exposed to scrutiny and the criticism of the public.62 This different threshold of protection is due to the fact that they have voluntarily exposed themselves to a stricter scrutiny. Their 58 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez y Lapo Iñiguez, supra note 17, para. 93. 59 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 44, para. 46; ; Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, paras. 121 and 123; Case of Palamara-Iribarne, supra note 12, para. 85, and Case of Claude-Reyes et al., supra note 44, para. 91. 60 The pecuniary sanction Mr. Kimel was sentenced to pay amounted to $ 20,000.00 (twenty thousand Argentine pesos). Cf. Judgment of March 17, 1999, supra note 36, folio 138. According to the exchange rate prevailing at the time, said amount was equivalent to the same amount in US dollars. According to the representatives’ statements, which were not challenged by the State, the execution of this sanction “would imply the economic bankruptcy of Mr. Kimel, who would lose all his property and would go into debt for a very lon[g] time.” 61 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 128, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para 98. 62 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 12, para. 129, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 103.