19 proceeding is contrary to the possibility of promoting extensive debate, as it discourages the participation of individuals in general, and even of professional journalists, in the debate of public issues.” In this regard, “criminal penalties have a strong restraining effect.” On the other hand, they objected to the existence of civil sanctions, as they “also have a strong restraining effect, in particular for those who work as journalists,” since “the salaries paid by the press are rather low;” and, therefore, “it is virtually impossible for a journalist or an ordinary citizen to pay the amounts set as compensatory damages in condemnatory judgments without going bankrupt,” and because “except for the big multimedia, no communication media offer guarantees to their employees as to their ability to pay.” 74. In examining this issue, the Court must consider the available alternatives to achieve the legitimate purpose sought and to determine the greater or lesser injuriousness they imply.55 75. Every fundamental right is to be exercised with regard for other fundamental rights. This is a reconcilement process in which the State has a key role in trying to determine responsibilities and impose sanctions as may be necessary to achieve such purpose. Resorting to civil or criminal proceedings will depend on the considerations discussed below. 76. The Court has held that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and harshest means to establish liability for an illegal conduct.56 The broad definition of the crime of defamation might be contrary to the principle of minimum, necessary, appropriate, and last resort or ultima ratio intervention of criminal law. In a democratic society punitive power is exercised only to the extent that is strictly necessary in order to protect fundamental legal rights from serious attacks which may impair or endanger them. The opposite would result in the abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State. 77. Taking into account the considerations made so far regarding the due protection of the right to freedom of thought and expression; the reasonable reconcilement of the protection of such right, on the one hand, and the right to have one’s honor respected, on the other; and the principle of minimum penal law typical of democratic societies, criminal proceedings should be resorted to where fundamental legal rights must be protected from conducts which imply a serious infringement thereof and where they are proportionate to the seriousness of the damage caused. The criminal definition of a conduct must be clear and accurate, as established by the case law of the Court regarding Article 9 of the American Convention. 78. The Court does not deem any criminal sanction regarding the right to inform or give one’s opinion to be contrary to the provisions of the Convention; however, this possibility should be carefully analyzed, pondering the extreme seriousness of the conduct of the individual who expressed the opinion, his actual malice, the characteristics of the unfair damage caused, and other information which shows the absolute necessity to resort to criminal proceedings as an exception. At all stages the burden of proof must fall on the party who brings the criminal proceedings. Along these lines, the Court takes note of the trends in the case law of other Courts tending to promote, in a rational and balanced manner, the protection of those who are entitled to rights apparently contradictory, without affecting the guarantees required by the right to freedom of thought and expression as a milestone of democracy.57 55 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez y Lapo Iñiguez, supra note 17, para. 93. 56 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 44, para. 104, and Case of Palamara-Iribarne, supra note 12, para. 79. 57 In the Case of Mamere the European Court of Human Rights considered that “the eminent value of freedom of expression, especially in debates on subjects of general concern, cannot take precedence in all