23 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT) which were also specifically "excluded from the procedures described in the General Act". 55. In any event, "the Court cannot base itself on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text" (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I. C.J. Reports 1952, p. 104). A number of considerations of a substantive character point decisively to the conclusion that resemation (b) in fact contained two separate and autonomous reservations. One is that the making of reservations to the General Act was expressly authorized and regulated by Article 39, which allowed only the reservations "exhaustively enumerated" in paragraph 2 of the Article, namely: "(a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the Party making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the said Party may have a dispute; (b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States; (c) Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subjectmatters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories." When a multilateral treaty thus provides in advance for the making only of particular, designated categories of resemations, there is clearly a high probability, if not an actual presumption, that reservations made in terms used in the treaty are intended to relate to the corresponding categories in the treaty. Nor does the fact that the instrument of accession includes in a single paragraph two categories of disputes which are listed in the treaty as separate categories, by itself, in any way dirninish that probability. When making resemations under the General Act, States have not, as a rule, meticulously followed the pattern of resemations set out in Article 39, paragraph 2; and they have not infrequently grouped together in one paragraph two or more reservations listed separately in the Act. 56. In the present instance, the very structure of reservation (b) hardly seems consistent with an intention to make "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece", which are placed by the General Act in one category, merely an example of disputes concerning questions of domestic jurisdiction, which are placed by the Act in a quite different category. If that had been the intention at the time, it would have been natural for those who drafted Greece's instrument of accession to put the words y compris (including) where the words et, notamment, (and in particular) in fact appear in reservation (b) and the words et, notamment, where the words y compris are now found. But that is not how resemation (b) was drafted. 57. A further consideration is that Greece's declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court contained a provision which, indisputably, was an autonomous resemation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece". That declaration, made on 12 September 1929, only two years 24