00c52? conclusive factual reasons, thc Court has gone too far beyond the margin, thereby denying Article 56 (61 ofthe Charter and Rule 40 (6) ofthe Rules of Procedure any meaninglul etfect. lt has widely opened a door that will be very difficult for it to closc and, morcover, this would not encourage States to make the Declaration accepting the competence of the Courts to reccivc petitions from individuals and NGOs, pursuant to Article 34(6) ofthe Protocol. 15. In the instant case, it should be noted that the Applicant did not hasten to seize the Court. Ile waited until 26 May 2017 to do so. lhroughout this period, he spent time seeking other rcmcdics internally (request for presidential pardon)e and betbre an international tribunal ('l'he Human Rights Comnr ittee), which are not considcred by the African Court as remedies that had to be exhausted. This is clearly pointed out in paragraph 57 ofthe J udgmcnt. 16. According to the Court's settled case-law, the request for presidential pardon is not considered as an LR to be exhausted by the applicants. Consequently, the date on which the request for pardon was denied cannot be considered as a starting point for the calculation of the time limit for bringing an application befbre the African Court. ln its judgment of 3 f une 20'1.6, in Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of T'anzania, the Court held that "the remedies that must be exhausted [by the Applicants] are ordinary judiciat remedies". Obviously, the request for presidential pardon does not fall into this category. 17. Similarly, recourse to an international. univcrsal or regional judicial or non-judicial body cannot constitute an LR. lt is by definition an external remedy whose admissibility is predicated upon the exhaustion of LRs. ln its Views, on 27 of March 2014, the CDR noted that [Thc Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do in accordance with the provisions of article 5(2Xa) of the Optional Protocol, that thc same question was no1 under consideration befbre another international body for purposes of invcstigation or setllement. lt notes thal domestic remedies have been exhausted. The -fhe State Party has not challenged this finding. requirements set lorth in Article 5(2Xa) ol'the C)ptional Protocol are therefbre lulfilled.l ofthe dilatory tactics ofthe Respondent State, decided to seize this Court six years and two months after the delivery of the Supreme 18. ln fact, the Applicant, weary Court judgment dismissing his appeal and upholding his sentence, and more than four years later, the Views of the HRC. For this Court, all these facts are of no moment! ')'lhe Republic ofGhana is one ofthe 29 States that respected the moratorium on executions. In case ofa death penalry, it is customary to seek a presidential pardon. 'i'he President oI Chana has alrvays commuted death penalties to life imprisonment. Thus, in 2009, the outgoing Prcsident of Ghana, John Agyckum Kufuor, com nluted thc pena)tics of all those who had been sentenced to death to life irr plisolirDert, or to an irnprisonrnenL Lerm uf twenty years for those who had spent a decade on death row. In the sarne vein, lhose who had received a death peoalty but had fallen seriously ill were released tbllowing a medical report to that effect. We have no information as to whether Applicant Dexter Eddie lohnson benefitted from such a m e;1s u re. l1!J/__. tt]a't'.p!tn!Llcpbrt.ot s LloLtoltent JJE I ( ;t'd,.,! t.)/_!fdt!lJJ!!1!-:!-l!!!11!J:2!tdSJt!t(s pprt Also. rn 2014, on the occasion of the 54th anniversary of the Republic of Chana, President John Dramani Mahama cummuted the death penalties of 21 inmates to Iife imprisonment, 4