prosecution in them thereby having a chilling effect on their freedom of expression as journalists. Acknowledging the fact that the restriction is contained in the law they contend that that is not enough as the law has to be formulated with sufficient precision. They contend that the definition of seditious intention is based on subjective reactions of the reader while definition of defamatory matter under section 179 does not establish an objective standard as to enable the writer determine ahead of the publication whether the publication will fall within the definition of defamatory matter. Referring to the provision of sections 59 and 181A on false news, they submit that the possibility of error in journalistic work cannot be avoided and as such the existence of criminal liability for such errors impedes their right to freedom of expression and so cannot be provided by law and that maintaining the provision has not been shown to serve any legitimate purpose. The plaintiffs further contended that limitations in order to be lawful must be shown to be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued. The defendant in response maintained that the provisions of the sections under reference satisfy the requirements of a good law within the contemplation of Article 19(3) of ICCPR. They further submit that the interpretation of what is harmful or offensive to the reputation of others are culturally and politically relative and that the stipulations in the provisions being challenged are reflections of the Defendants 31