M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 103 applicant. In this approach, for people who, like the applicant, are vulnerable (paragraph 263 of the judgment), such deprivations amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. Is this to mean that when it comes to particularly vulnerable people, failure by the State to provide material services that satisfy essential needs amounts to a violation of Article 3? The Court’s present construction of insufficient living conditions as inhuman and degrading treatment is not without antecedents. The Court has already conceded, obiter, that State responsibility could arise for “inhuman and degrading treatment” where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity (see Budina v. Russia (dec.), no. 45603/05, 18 June 2009). In that case, the Court did in fact admit the possibility of social welfare obligations of the State in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. It did so in the name of dignity, and relying on a theory of positive obligations of the State. Such obligations would include the prevention of serious deprivation through appropriate government-provided services. This position, of course, would be perfectly compatible with the concept of the Social Welfare State and social rights, at least for a constitutional court adjudicating on the basis of a national constitution that has constitutionalised the Social Welfare State. Relying on the Budina reasoning, the Court concludes that “the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum-seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation in which he has found himself for several months, living on the street, with no resources ...” (paragraph 263) With the above formulation, the Court’s position regarding Article 3 of the Convention and the constitutional position of a Welfare State are getting even closer. The current position seems to be that with regard to vulnerable groups in an undignified material situation, the State is responsible under Article 3 if it is passive over a lengthy period of time. The position of the Court implies that the applicant is living “in circumstances wholly dependent on State support”. (However, being in possession of the “pink card”, even the penniless have some independence vis-à-vis the State.) The above position is open to criticism and not only because of the overbroad concept of vulnerability and dependence. In order to avoid the undignified situation of alleged total dependency, the Court seems to require that the Greek State should handle applications within a reasonably short time and with utmost care – a requirement that I fully agree with – and/or that it should provide adequately for basic needs (a conclusion I cannot follow.) There seems to be only a small step between the Court’s present position and that of a general and unconditional positive obligation of the State to provide shelter and other material services to satisfy the basic needs of the “vulnerable”. The Court seems to indicate that the welfare obligation