GAHRAMANOV v. AZERBAIJAN DECISION 7 36. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s stay in the SBS room had lasted only approximately two hours and did not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. In that connection the Government stated that the applicant had not been detained in any special detention facility and that there had only been a minor degree of confinement in the SBS room. Moreover, according to the Government, the applicant had been free to leave the airport following a two-hour stay in the room, but had refused to do so, asking for a written record of his detention, and therefore his further stay at the airport had been due to the applicant’s own conduct. As regards whether the applicant’s detention complied with the national law, the Government relied on the provisions of the Regulations of 29 November 1994. 37. The applicant maintained his complaint, reiterating that his detention for approximately four hours at the airport had been unlawful. In particular, he submitted that he had been detained in the SBS room and not permitted to leave the room. He also noted that he had had no opportunity to contact members of his family during his detention and that he had not been provided with any document relating to the detention. 38. The Court notes that it must first examine whether there was in the instant case a deprivation of liberty to which Article 5 applies. The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention enshrines a fundamental right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. In proclaiming the “right to liberty”, paragraph 1 of Article 5 contemplates the physical liberty of the person; its aim is to ensure that no one should be deprived of that liberty in an arbitrary fashion. It is not concerned with mere restrictions on the liberty of movement; such restrictions are governed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. In order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of liberty, the starting point must be the specific situation of the individual concerned, and account must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular case, such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The distinction between a deprivation of, and a restriction upon, liberty is merely one of degree or intensity and not one of nature or substance (see Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, § 92, Series A no. 39, and Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, § 57, ECHR 2012). 39. The Court further points out that Article 5 § 1 may apply to deprivations of liberty of a very short length, for example where applicants were stopped for a search which did not exceed thirty minutes (see Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, § 57, ECHR 2010 (extracts)) or the length of time during which the applicant was held at the police station did not exceed forty-five minutes (see Shimovolos v. Russia, no. 30194/09, §§ 48-50, 21 June 2011). However, the Court observes that in the present case the applicant was detained in circumstances which were