A. Criminal proceedings against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel 1. Right to defense 152. The representatives alleged that the court-appointed defense counsels i) “d[id] not present evidence in favor of the [detainees] or [to] contradict the evidence […] presented against them; ii) did not inform them about their right not to make a statement; iii) did not challenge the lack of diligence of the military officers; iv) did not challenge the interrogations conducted […] after their arrest without the presence of a lawyer; v) did not challenge the expert opinions rendered by persons not specialized [in this matter]; vi) did not demand the necessary measures to certify the injuries [against the alleged victims]; vi) (sic) did not have a previous interview with them and vii) did not denounce the alleged torture committed against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. Likewise, they indicated that the court order declaring the lawfulness of the victims’ arrest was not challenged, despite the fact that the 48-hour period for bringing them before a judicial authority had expired. 153. The Commission did not present arguments regarding this matter. The State pointed out that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel “received the appropriate public legal counseling and assistance.” It mentioned that the victims were always in contact with the lawyers in order to prepare their defense. 154. The Court has previously held that the right to defense must necessarily be exercised from the moment a person is accused of perpetrating or participating in an unlawful action and only ends when the proceeding concludes, 234 including, where applicable, the enforcement phase. To prevent a person from exercising his right to defense from the moment the investigation against him begins and the authority in charge orders or executes actions that imply an curtailment of rights is to enhance the investigative powers of the State to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the person under investigation. The right to defense requires the State to treat the individual, at all times, as a true party to the proceeding, in the broadest sense of this concept, and not simply as an object thereof. 235 155. In particular, the Court emphasizes that the defense provided by the State must be effective, for which purpose the State must adopt all the appropriate measures. 236 If the right to defense begins from the moment when an investigation into an individual is ordered, the accused must have access to legal representation from that moment onwards, especially during the procedure in which his statement is rendered. To prevent the accused from receiving assistance from a defense counsel is to severely limit his right to defense, which leads to a procedural imbalance and leaves the individual unprotected before the punitive authority. 237 However, the appointment of a defense counsel for the sole purpose of complying with a procedural formality would be tantamount to not having a technical legal representation; therefore, it is imperative that the defense counsel act diligently in order to protect the procedural guarantees of the accused and thereby prevent his rights from being violated. 234 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 29. See mutatis mutandis Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997, Series Nº. 35, para. 71; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C N. 186, para. 148; and Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra note 123, para. 105. 235 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 29. 236 Cf. ECHR, Case of Artico v. Italy, Judgment of 13 May 1980, App. N°. 6694/74, paras. 31-37. 237 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 62. 61