must prevail. If the Convention itself establishes that its provisions do not have a restrictive effect on other international instruments, it makes even less sense to invoke restrictions contained in those other international instruments, but not in the Convention, to limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the latter. 39. In the case of absolute incompatibility, where no “conventional interpretation” is possible, if the judge lacks the authority to suspend the rule, he is limited merely to indicating its non-compliance with the Convention or, where appropriate, “calling into question its conventionality” before other competent courts within the same national legal system so that they can exercise “conventionality control” with greater intensity. Thus, the reviewing judicial bodies will have to exercise that “control” and disregard the rule or declare it invalid based on its non-compliance with the Convention. 40. What does not seem reasonable and would be outside the scope of the Inter-American Court’s interpretation, is that no national body has jurisdiction to exercise “diffuse conventionality control" with strong great intensity, that is, to cease to apply the rule to a particular case or with general effects as a result of its nonconformity with the Convention, since otherwise there would be international responsibility on the part of the State. We must not lose sight of the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention relating to the obligation to respect human rights and the duty to adopt provisions of domestic law. As the Inter-American Court itself has pointed out, the latter provision is also “aimed at facilitating the work of the Judiciary so that the law enforcement authority has a clear option on how to settle a particular case” 52 in situations involving fundamental rights. Thus, in the specific Case of Almonacid Arellano which gave rise to the doctrine of “diffuse conventionality control”, the Inter-American Court is emphatic in establishing in para. 123 that: when the Legislative Branch fails to abolish and/or adopt laws that are contrary to the American Convention, the Judiciary is bound to honor the obligation to respect rights as stated in Article 1(1) of the Convention, and consequently, it must refrain from enforcing any laws contrary to that Convention. When State agents or officials uphold a law that violates the Convention, the State is internationally liable under International Human Rights Law, inasmuch as every State is internationally responsible for the acts or omissions committed by any of its branches or bodies in violation of internationally protected rights, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 53 (Underlining added). 41. Thus, although “diffuse conventionality control” is exercised by all domestic judges, it has different degrees of intensity and application, according to "their respective competences and the corresponding procedural regulations." In principle, all judges and courts are required to make an “interpretation” of the national standard in light of the Convention, its Additional Protocols (and possibly other treaties), as well as the case-law of the Inter-American Court, always using the interpretive rule of the pro homine principle in Article 29 of the Pact of San Jose. In this first degree of intensity, the judge will make an interpretation according to the conventional parameters and, therefore, will discard those 52 Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, supra note 13, para. 123. 53 Cf. Case of Ximenes Lopes, supra note 13, para. 172; and Case of Baldeón García, supra note 13, para. 140. 15