II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF “FOURTH INSTANCE” AND “CONVENTIONALITY CONTROL” 4. The respondent State asserted the preliminary objection of the InterAmerican Court’s lack of jurisdiction, considering that the intention before this international body was to review the criminal procedures that were followed by all competent judicial organs at the domestic level, where remedies (appeals) were also filed, as were amparo appeal hearings; moreover, it affirmed that the “conventionality control” was exercised ex officio, which renders the Inter-American Court incompetent inasmuch as it cannot “review” a matter that was adjudicated and decided previously by the domestic judges, who applied conventional parameters. This argument regarding the prior exercise of “conventionality control” in the domestic courts, as a preliminary objection, is an innovation and was the subject of special attention by the judges of the Inter-American Court. 5. In principle, we should recall that the Inter-American Court has held that “if the State has violated its international obligations by virtue of the actions of its judicial bodies, this may prompt the [Inter-American] Court to examine the respective domestic procedures to establish their compatibility with the American Convention, 3 which may possibly include the decisions of higher courts.” 4 6. In this regard, although constant case law exists on preliminary objections regarding the “fourth instance,” this is the first time that it is argued that domestic courts effectively exercised “conventionality control” in an ordinary [civil] process which was continued in all the instances, including the ordinary and extraordinary remedies filed, and therefore cannot be examined again by the judges of the InterAmerican Court, since this would imply a review of the decisions issued by the domestic courts, which applied Inter-American standards. In this regard, the InterAmerican Court reiterates that although international protection in the form of a convention reinforc[es] or complement[s] the protection provided by the domestic law of the American states,” as stated in the Preamble to the American Convention on Human Rights (principle of subsidiarity that has also been recognized from its initial jurisprudence), 5 the fact is that in order to carry out an evaluative analysis of compliance with certain international obligations, “there is an intrinsic relationship between an analysis of international and domestic law.” (para. 16 of the Judgment). 7. This “interaction” becomes, in reality, a “live interaction” 6 with intense communicating vessels that bring about “jurisprudential dialogue,” in the sense 3 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 222; Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009. Series C No. 200, para. 44, and Case of Da Costa Cadogan v. Barbados. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 24, 2009, Series C No. 204, para. 12. 4 Cf. Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguala”) v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2010, para. 49. 5 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61: “The rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies allows the State to resolve the problem under its domestic law before being confronted with an international proceeding. This is particularly true in the international jurisdiction of human rights, because the latter ‘reinforces or complements’ the domestic jurisdiction (American Convention, Preamble).” 6 Statement by the current President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Diego GarcíaSayán; Cf. His work, “Una Viva Interacción: Corte Interamericana y Tribunales Internos”, [A Live 2