52. Thus, the “regulatory force” of the American Convention extends to the interpretation made thereof by the Inter-American Court, as the “final interpreter" of the Pact in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Convention, acquires the same efficacy as the latter, since “conventional rules” are really the result of the “conventional interpretation” undertaken by the Inter-American Court as an “autonomous judicial organ whose objective is the independent judicial application and interpretation” 65 of the Inter-American corpus juris. In other words, the result of the interpretation of the American Convention constitutes its jurisprudence; that is to say, “the standards derived from the ACHR, which enjoy the same (direct) effectiveness as that international treaty.” 66 e) Effects of “diffuse conventionality control”: retroactive where necessary to ensure full effectiveness of the right or freedom 53. As noted in our analysis of the degrees of intensity of “diffuse conventionality control”, the outcome of the examination of compatibility between the national standard and the “conventionality block” involves “annulling” those interpretations that not in conformity with the Convention, or those which are less favorable; or, if this cannot be achieved, the consequence would be to “invalidate” the national standard, either in a specific case or with general effects, declaring it invalid in accordance with the judge's authority to carry out said control. 54. The foregoing is more complicated when national regulations only allow the general announcement of the standard for the future (ex nunc effect) and not in the past (ex tunc), as it seems that the intention of the Inter-American Court when it established the doctrine of “diffuse conventionality control” was that any standard not in conformity with the Convention lacks legal effect “from the outset.” 67 This precedent was reiterated in subsequent cases, especially in cases regarding self-amnesty laws 68 or in other circumstances. 69 However, this criterion 65 Article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, approved by resolution num. 448 of the OAS General Assembly in La Paz, Bolivia (October 1979). 66 Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Eduardo, and Silva García, Fernando, “Homicidios de mujeres por razón de género. El Case of Campo Algodonero”, [Homicides of women for reasons of gender. The Case of the Cotton Fields]. in von Bogdandy, Armin, Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Eduardo, and Morales Antoniazzi, Mariela (coords.), La justicia constitucional y su internacionalización: ¿Hacia un Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina?, [Constitutional Justice and its Internationalization: Towards a Ius Constitutionale Commune in Latin America?] Mexico, UNAM-Max Planck Institut, 2010, tome II, pp. 259-333, in pp. 296-297. 67 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 13, para. 124. 68 For example, in the Case of La Cantúta v. Peru, supra note 16, para. 174: “In line with this view, the remaining dispute must be understood as part of the first set of measures that must be adopted to adapt domestic law to the Convention. In order to better understand the issue, it should be noted that the Court has found that, in Peru, the self-amnesty laws are ab initio incompatible with the Convention; that is, their mere enactment “constitutes per se a violation of the Convention” since it “overtly conflicts with the obligations assumed by a State Party” to such treaty. This is the rationale behind the Court’s ruling with general effects in the case of Barrios Altos. That is why its application by a state organ in a specific case, through subsequent statutory instruments or through its enforcement by state officers, constitutes a violation to the Convention. Moreover, in the Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguala”) v. Brazil, supra note 4, para. 106. 69 For example, in the Case of Radilla Pacheco v. United Mexican States, supra note 19, para. 339; as well as the recent Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra note 24, para. 202. 19