considers that the State’s argument citing the specific orography of Pizotla as a justification for the delay in bringing the detainees before the competent authority is not convincing because: i) there are flight logs showing that some Air Force helicopters carried out operations in the area on May 3, 1999; ii) the military personnel responsible for the operation had a radio station and 4 vehicles, and iii) given the military presence in Pizotla, there should have been greater control mechanisms over any detentions that might be carried out by the military agents. 101. Consequently, the Court finds that, from the moment the alleged victims were arrested, the Army agents had more than one means to transport them and bring them, without delay, first before the Public Prosecutor’s Office and, subsequently, before a judge, at least, on May 3, 1999. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the authority of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Arcelia visited the scene of the events at 8:00 a.m. on May 4th, 1999, and despite that, it did not take custody of the alleged victims (supra para. 97). 102. According to the Court’s case-law (supra para. 93) concerning the competent authority, this Court reiterates that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel should have been brought before a judge as soon as possible and, in this case, that did not happen until nearly 5 days after their arrest. In that regard, the Court notes that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel were not brought before the competent authority within the time established in the American Convention, which clearly states that the detainee must be “promptly” brought before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. The Court reiterates that in areas with a significant military presence, where members of the military forces take control of internal security, bringing a person without delay before the judicial authorities is even more important in order to minimize any risk of violating a person’s rights (supra para. 89). Accordingly, the Court considers that Article 7(5) of the American Convention was violated to the detriment of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. Furthermore, given the failure to promptly bring them before the competent authority, the Court considers that this irregularity in overseeing the arrest transformed it into an arbitrary arrest and does not deem it pertinent to issue any type of ruling on the cause of the arrest. Therefore, the Court declares the violation of Article 7(3) in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 5. Alleged lack of information on the reasons for the arrest and lack of prompt notification of the charge or charges filed 103. The representatives pointed out that “[i]t has not been disputed that Teodoro Cabrera and Rodolfo Montiel were not informed of the reasons for their arrest when this occurred. Also, as has been proven, the [alleged] victims [were not] informed of their right to [...] ‘make contact with a third party, for example, a family member [or] an attorney’.” 1999].” Consequently, according to the Judge of first instance, “the specified timeframe of [48] hours available to the Public Prosecutor’s Office expired at [6:00 p.m. of May 6, 1999].” Consequently, “the term said to have been exceeded by only [6] minutes, is deemed more or less tolerable and is not sufficient to be considered a prolonged detention, taking into account that the detainees did not have any communication or contact with any person, or it is deemed that there was some sort of physical or moral coercion against them.” Cf. Judgment issued on August 28, 2000 by the First Single-Magistrate Tribunal, supra note 75, pages 12161 to 12163. The criminal amparo ruling indicated, again that "there was no prolonged or unjustified detention on the part of the arresting agents.” In this regard, the court stated that “from the case records, there is no evidence that when the soldiers went to Pizotla, Guerrero, they had means of transportation.” It added that “the soldiers were unable to leave the place that was the scene of the crime, since they had the obligation to remain there because of the death of a person, […] until the arrival of […] the Agent of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.” Cf. Judgment issued on August 14, 2002 by the Second Collegiate Tribunal, supra note 84, page 14441. 38