III. THE DOCTRINE OF “DIFFUSE CONVENTIONALITY CONTROL” AND ITS CLARIFICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE A. EMERGENCE AND REITERATION OF THE DOCTRINE 13. The doctrine of “conventionality control” emerged in 2006 11 in the Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile: 12 123. The abovementioned legislative requirement established by Article 2 of the Convention is also intended to facilitate the work of the Judiciary so that the law enforcement authority has a clear option on how to settle a particular case. However, when the Legislative branch fails to abolish or adopt laws that are contrary to the American Convention, the Judiciary remains bound to honor the obligation to respect rights as stated in Article 1(1) of the Convention; consequently, it must refrain from enforcing any laws contrary to said Convention. When State agents or officials uphold a law that violates the Convention, the State is internationally liable under International Human Rights Law, inasmuch as every State is internationally responsible for the acts or omissions committed by any of its branches or bodies in violation of internationally protected rights, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 13 124. The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are required to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State, are also bound by that treaty. This obliges them to ensure that the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not impaired by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its object and purpose, and which have had no legal effects from the outset. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a form of conventionality control” between the domestic legal provisions which apply to specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judiciary must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention. (Underlining added). 125. Similarly, this Court has established that “under international law, the obligations imposed must be fulfilled in good faith and domestic laws cannot be invoked to justify their violation.” 14 This provision is embodied in 11 There have been previous references to “conventionality control” in some concurring opinions by Judge Sergio García Ramírez. Cf. His concurring opinions in the Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, of November 25, 2003, para. 27; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, of September 7, 2004, para. 3; Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, supra note 8, para. 6 and 12. 12 Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 123 to 125. 13 Cf. Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. 172; and Case of Baldeón García v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 6, 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 140. 14 Cf. International Responsibility for the Issuance and Application of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994, Series A No. 14, para. 35. 5