143. Accordingly, the gravamen of discrimination against women on the basis of sex and gender is the unjustifiable distinction or differential treatment of persons in relevantly analogous situations. 45 The corollary is that for the Commission to make a finding of discrimination of discrimination there must be differential treatment of analogous parties which lacks justification. In Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt, the Commission acknowledged that no discrimination exists where a difference in treatment is reasonable, objective, and aims to achieve a legitimate purpose. 144. The Commission recalls that where a ,Complainant alleges discrimination in violation of Article 2 of the Charter, they bear the burden to make a prima facie case that the Respondent State had not given the Complainant the same treatmen~, it accorded to the others in analogous situations or, that, the respondent state had ,accorded less favorable treatment to the Complainant than that accorded to , others in relevantly analogous situation, or indeed that the State imposecl a disproportionate burden or restriction on the Complainant relative to that imposed on others in relevantly analogous situations. 46 145. The Gommission notes that in the present case, the Complainants have demonstrated that first daughters of chiefs do not enjoy some rights that are undisputedly given to first sons. The Commission notes that eldest sons are permitted to inherit their father's thrones whilst eldest daughters are not. Put specifically, S10 of the Chieftainship Act as well as its confirmation by the Lesotho Court of Appeal treat th~Erst Complainant differently from first-born sons of chiefs. This is th,e ,Comrnissibn:' s view prima facie evidence of differential treatment of analogously situated parties. 146. As enunciated in Equality Now 47 and previously in Egyptian Initiative, 48 following a prima facie case of differential treatment being made, the onus would traditionally shift to the Respondent State to dispute that such treatment was not differential or to justify the differential treatment as it were. 147. The Commission recalls that in the present case, the Respondent State has not participated in these proceedings. However, the Commission considers that the information before it is sufficient to determine whether or not the differential treatrnent between eldest daughters of chiefs and eldest sons of chiefs constitutes impermissible discrimination in violation of Article 2 of the Charter and Article 18(3) of the Maputo Protocol.