4. (d) appointment of a Governor and Deputy Governor(s) shall vest in the Head of State or Government of each State Party and where applicable, shall be ratified by the Legislature; (e) Central banking legislation shall provide for fair and transparent procedure and grounds under which the Governors and Deputy Governors may be removed from office; (f) members of the Board of Directors of Central Banks should be appointed from among persons of proven experience in fields relevant to central banking: (i) by Ministers responsible for Finance and Investment; and (ii) by the shareholders as prescribed by relevant legislation, in the case of central banks with private shareholders; (g) whereas civil servants may, where individual country circumstances require, sit on the Board of central banks, such appointments which may compromise the independence of the central banks should be in the minority; and (h) Members of Parliament shall be disqualified from sitting on the Boards of central banks. Principles for transparency and accountability: (a) There shall be established a monetary policy committee whose composition, structure and functions shall be publicly disclosed; (b) legislation should stipulate the extent and frequency of financial and operational disclosures by Central Banks to parliament or a committee of parliament, and also to the public at large; (c) the remuneration and benefits of Governors, Deputy Governors and members of the Board should be disclosed to parliament annually; and (d) every Central Bank shall publish an annual report detailing its operations and audited financial statements. The report shall be distributed to all stakeholders. (e) Notwithstanding the establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee in Article 4(4) (a) above, the Governor shall be ultimately accountable and responsible for monetary policy. 59