claims collectively under those relevant provisions of the African Charter. 65. Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities] (adopted at the Twenty-eighth Session, 2003). 66. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2002),Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97, (2002) at para. [99 and 100]. 67. See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 8, Membership of Racial or Ethnic Groups Based on Self-Identification (Thirty-eighth Session, 1990), U.N. Doc. A/45/18 at 79 (1991). “The Committee” , in General Recommendation VIII stated that membership in a group, “shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned”. 68. See Report of the Special Rapporteur (Rodolfo Stavenhagen) on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People on “Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97, (2002) at para. 100 , where he argues that selfidentification is a key criterion for determining who is indeed indigenous. 69. Op. cit, infra n. 71. 70. See [http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/admissible/suriname11821.htm]Moiwana Village v Suriname, th th Judgment of June 15 , 2005[/url]. Series C No. 124, paras 85 and 134-135. On 29 November 1986, the Suriname army attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana and massacred over 40 men, women and children, and razed the village to the ground. Those who escaped the attack fled into the surrounding forest, and th then into exile or internal displacement. On 12 November 1987, almost a year later, Suriname simultaneously ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and recognised the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of th Human Rights (IACtHR). Almost ten years later, on 27 June 1997, a petition was filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR) and later on lodged with the IACtHR. The Commission stated that, while the attack itself predated Suriname’s ratification of the American Convention and its recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, the alleged denial of justice and displacement of the Moiwana community occurring subsequent to the attack comprise the subject matter of the application. In this case the IACtHR recognised collective land rights, despite being an Afro-descendent community (i.e. not a traditional pre-Colombian / ‘autochtonous’ understanding of indigenousness in the Americas). th 71. The Respondent State during the oral hearings at the 40 Ordinary Session in Banjul, The Gambia, stated that: (a) the Endorois do not deserve special treatment since they are no different from the other Tugen subgroup, and that (b) inclusion of some of the members of the Endorois in “modern society” has affected their cultural distinctiveness, such that it would be difficult to define them as a distinct legal personality (c) representation of the Endorois by the Endorois Welfare Council is allegedly not legitimate. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHmR), Report No.9/06 The Twelve Saramaka Clans (Los) v nd Suriname 27.10.2010 (March 2 , 2006) ; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Case of the Saramaka th People v Suriname (Judgment of 28 November 2007) atparas 80-84 . 72. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\ GEN\1\ Rev.1 (1994), 35. 73. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Thirty-sixth session, 1981), U.N. GA Res. 36/55. 74. See Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1995), para. 45. See also the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, (Thirty-sixth session, 1981), U.N. GA Res. 36/55. 75. See paras 73 and 74. 76. Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (1999) (hereinafter Amnesty International v. Sudan). 77. Loren Laroye Riebe Star, Jorge Alberto Baron Guttlein and Rodolfo Izal Elorz/Mexico, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, (1999). Dianna Ortiz v. Guatemala, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Report 31/96, Case 10.526, (1997). 78. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994), 35, para. 8 . 79. The African Commission is of the view that the limitations placed on the State’s duties to protect rights should be viewed in light of the underlying sentiments of the African Charter. This was the view of the Commission, in Amnesty International v. Zambia where it noted that the ‘claw-back’ clauses must not be interpreted against the principles of the Charter … and that recourse to these should not be used as a means of giving credence to violations of the express provisions of the Charter. See Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, (1999), pars. 82 and 80. 80. Amnesty International v. Zambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 212/98 (1999). 81. See para 3.3.3 of the Respondent’s Merits brief. 82. Italics for emphasis. 83. Italics for emphasis. 84. See The Mayagna Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2001), para. 146 (hereinafter the Awas Tingni Case 2001). The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them in