127. The objection is therefore dismissed. 128. In view of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Respondent State’s objection to its material jurisdiction, and declares that it has material jurisdiction to hear this case. ii. Objection to the Court’s territorial jurisdiction 129. Referring to Article 2 of the ICCPR and the Court’s jurisprudence, the Respondent State contends that the Court only has jurisdiction if the alleged violations took place on the territory of the State in question. In this case, however, the Respondent State submits that the events alleged by the Applicant State to be the subject of the Application, did not take place on its territory. 130. The Respondent State recognises, however, that human rights bodies “have accepted extraterritorial jurisdiction”: (i) based on specific provisions and wording of the relevant treaties; (ii) in exceptional cases; and (iii) “reluctantly”, in situations of armed conflict outside the territory of the State concerned, where the latter is involved. To this end, it cites Article 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as “the European Convention on Human Rights”), which refers to jurisdiction and not territory, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the ECHR”). 131. The Respondent State holds that the Charter and the Protocol do not contain a similar provision and, therefore, considers that it is proper for the Court to limit its jurisdiction to events occurring in the territory of the State concerned. In addition, it argues that the Applicant State fails to prove the existence of exceptional criteria enabling the Court to reverse its jurisprudence by declaring that it has jurisdiction based on extraterritoriality. 32