time that the “officer” may later intervene in subsequent criminal proceedings on behalf of the prosecuting authority, his independence and impartiality may be open to doubt (see the Huber v. Switzerland judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 188, p. 18, § 43 and the Brincat v. Italy judgment of 26 November 1992, Series A no. 249-A, p. 12, § 21). The “officer” must hear the individual brought before him in person and review, by reference to legal criteria, whether or not the detention is justified. If it is not so justified, the “officer” must have the power to make a binding order for the detainee’s release (see the above-mentioned Schiesser judgment, pp. 13-14, § 31, and the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 76, § 199). 147. The Court notes at the outset that Mr Assenov’s application for release was not considered by a judge until 19 September 1995 (see paragraph 38 above), three months into his detention. This was clearly insufficiently “prompt” for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 (see, for example, the Brogan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145, p. 33, § 62), and indeed it has not been argued that this procedure was adequate to satisfy the requirements of this provision. 148. The Court recalls that on 28 July 1995 Mr Assenov was brought before an investigator who questioned him, formally charged him, and took the decision to detain him on remand (see paragraph 33 above). It notes that, under Bulgarian law, investigators do not have the power to make legally binding decisions as to the detention or release of a suspect. Instead, any decision made by an investigator is capable of being overturned by the prosecutor, who may also withdraw a case from an investigator if dissatisfied with the latter’s approach (see paragraphs 6669 above). It follows that the investigator was not sufficiently independent properly to be described as an “officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3. 149. Mr Assenov was not heard in person by prosecutor A., who approved the investigator’s decision (see paragraph 33 above), or by any of the other prosecutors who later decided that he should continue to be detained. In any case, since any one of these prosecutors could subsequently have acted against the applicant in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 66 above), they were not sufficiently independent or impartial for the purposes of Article 5 § 3. 150. The Court considers, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 on the grounds that the applicant was not brought before an “officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power”. (b) Right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial 151. The Government submitted that the preliminary investigation had been complex and timeconsuming, involving the questioning of a number of alleged accomplices and witnesses and the consideration of expert evidence. On 31 January 1997 it had been necessary for the prosecuting authorities to refer the case for further investigation and re-examination of witnesses when a conflict of interest between Mr Assenov and his alleged accomplices became apparent. Throughout the investigatory process the applicant and his parents had continually filed applications for his release, each of which had led to the investigation being suspended while the