on the basis of the evidence before it whether or not the applicant’s injuries were caused by the police as he alleged. (b) Adequacy of the investigation 101. The Court does, however, consider that the medical evidence, Mr Assenov’s testimony, the fact that he was detained for two hours at the police station, and the lack of any account from any witness of Mr Ivanov beating his son with sufficient severity to cause the reported bruising, together raise a reasonable suspicion that these injuries may have been caused by the police. 102. The Court considers that, in these circumstances, where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This obligation, as with that under Article 2, should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see, in relation to Article 2 of the Convention, the McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 49, § 161, the Kaya v. Turkey judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998…, p. …, § 86 and the Yasa v. Turkey judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-…, p. …, § 98). If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance (see paragraph 93 above), would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity. 103. The Court notes that following Mrs Ivanova’s complaint, the State authorities did carry out some investigation into the applicant’s allegations. It is not, however, persuaded that this investigation was sufficiently thorough and effective to meet the above requirements of Article 3. In this respect it finds it particularly unsatisfactory that the DDIA investigator was prepared to conclude that Mr Assenov’s injuries had been caused by his father (see paragraph 16 above), despite the lack of any evidence that the latter had beaten his son with the force which would have been required to cause the bruising described in the medical certificate. Although this incident had taken place in public view at the bus station, and although, according to the statements of the police officers concerned, it was seen by approximately fifteen to twenty Roma and twenty bus drivers, no attempt appears to have been made to ascertain the truth through contacting and questioning these witnesses in the immediate aftermath of the incident, when memories would have been fresh. Instead, at that time a statement was taken from only one independent witness, who was unable to recall the events in question (see paragraph 99 above). 104. The initial investigation carried out by the Regional Military Prosecution Office (“RMPO”) and that of the General Military Prosecution Office (“GMPO”) were even more cursory. The Court finds it particularly striking that the GMPO could conclude, without any evidence that Mr Assenov had not been compliant, and without any explanation as to the nature of the alleged disobedience, that “even if the blows were administered on the body of the juvenile, they occurred as a result of disobedience to police orders” (see paragraph 26 above). To make such an assumption runs contrary to the principle under Article 3 that, in respect of a person deprived of