C. Temporal Jurisdiction Respondent's Objection 62. The Respondent submits that the Charter as well as any other treaty cannot be applied retrospectively to situations and circumstances that occurred before its entry into force. The Respondent cites Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 which provides that: "Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to the party". The Respondent further submits that it became a Party to the Charter on 10 February 1992, and that it is from 10 February 1992 that the Respondent's obligations under the Charter become enforceable. The Respondent adds that some of the Applicant's allegations of violations relate to activities that occurred prior to the Respondent ratifying the Charter and therefore the Court cannot adjudicate on those issues but only on issues that occurred after 1992. Applicant's Submission 63. The Applicant submits that it recognises the principle of non-retroactivity of international treaties. The Applicant argues, however, that, it also relies on the established principle of international human rights law, that the Respondent is liable for violations which occurred prior to the ratification of the Charter, where the effects of such violations have continued after its ratification , or where the Respondent either continued the perpetration of the said violations, or did not remedy them, as is the case with the Ogieks. The Court's Assessment 64. The Court has held that the relevant dates concerning its temporal jurisdiction are the dates when the Respondent became a Party to the Charter and the Protocol, as well as, where applicable, the date of deposit of the declaration accepting the