State responsibility 127 which States, attempting to set general standards of protection for a group or people, have assumed obligations protecting non-State entities.725 obligation, for example a coastal State specially affected by pollution in breach of an obligation aimed at protection of the marine environment in the collective interest. (8) Under paragraph 1 (b), States other than the injured State may invoke responsibility if the obligation in question was owed “to the international community as a whole”.726 The provision intends to give effect to the statement by ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, where the Court drew “an essential distinction” between obligations owed to particular States and those owed “towards the international community as a whole”.727 With regard to the latter, the Court went on to state that “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes”. (11) Paragraph 2 specifies the categories of claim which States may make when invoking responsibility under article 48. The list given in the paragraph is exhaustive, and invocation of responsibility under article 48 gives rise to a more limited range of rights as compared to those of injured States under article 42. In particular, the focus of action by a State under article 48—such State not being injured in its own right and therefore not claiming compensation on its own account—is likely to be on the very question whether a State is in breach and on cessation if the breach is a continuing one. For example, in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case, Japan, which had no economic interest in the particular voyage, sought only a declaration, whereas France, whose national had to bear the loss, sought and was awarded damages.730 In the South West Africa cases, Ethiopia and Liberia sought only declarations of the legal position.731 In that case, as the Court itself pointed out in 1971, “the injured entity” was a people, viz. the people of South West Africa.732 (9) While taking up the essence of this statement, the articles avoid use of the term “obligations erga omnes”, which conveys less information than the Court’s reference to the international community as a whole and has sometimes been confused with obligations owed to all the parties to a treaty. Nor is it the function of the articles to provide a list of those obligations which under existing international law are owed to the international community as a whole. This would go well beyond the task of codifying the secondary rules of State responsibility, and in any event, such a list would be only of limited value, as the scope of the concept will necessarily evolve over time. The Court itself has given useful guidance: in its 1970 judgment it referred, by way of example, to “the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide” and to “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination”.728 In its judgment in the East Timor case, the Court added the right of self-determination of peoples to this list.729 (10) Each State is entitled, as a member of the international community as a whole, to invoke the responsibility of another State for breaches of such obligations. Whereas the category of collective obligations covered by paragraph 1 (a) needs to be further qualified by the insertion of additional criteria, no such qualifications are necessary in the case of paragraph 1 (b). All States are by definition members of the international community as a whole, and the obligations in question are by definition collective obligations protecting interests of the international community as such. Of course, such obligations may at the same time protect the individual interests of States, as the prohibition of acts of aggression protects the survival of each State and the security of its people. Similarly, individual States may be specially affected by the breach of such an 725 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, establishing the Mandate system, was a provision in the general interest in this sense, as were each of the Mandate agreements concluded in accordance with it. Cf., however, the much-criticized decision of ICJ in South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6, from which article 48 is a deliberate departure. 726 For the terminology “international community as a whole”, see paragraph (18) of the commentary to article 25. 727 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33, and see paragraphs (2) to (6) of the commentary to chapter III of Part Two. 728 Barcelona Traction (ibid.), p. 32, para. 34. 729 See footnote 54 above. (12) Under paragraph 2 (a), any State referred to in article 48 is entitled to request cessation of the wrongful act and, if the circumstances require, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition under article 30. In addition, paragraph 2 (b) allows such a State to claim from the responsible State reparation in accordance with the provisions of chapter II of Part Two. In case of breaches of obligations under article 48, it may well be that there is no State which is individually injured by the breach, yet it is highly desirable that some State or States be in a position to claim reparation, in particular restitution. In accordance with paragraph 2 (b), such a claim must be made in the interest of the injured State, if any, or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. This aspect of article 48, paragraph 2, involves a measure of progressive development, which is justified since it provides a means of protecting the community or collective interest at stake. In this context it may be noted that certain provisions, for example in various human rights treaties, allow invocation of responsibility by any State party. In those cases where they have been resorted to, a clear distinction has been drawn between the capacity of the applicant State to raise the matter and the interests of the beneficiaries of the obligation.733 Thus, a State invoking responsibility under article 48 and claiming anything more than a declaratory remedy and cessation may be called on to establish that it is acting in the interest of the injured party. Where the injured party is a State, its Government will be able authoritatively to represent that interest. Other cases may present greater difficulties, which the present articles 730 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 30. South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319; South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment (see footnote 725 above). 732 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 127. 733 See, e.g., the observations of the European Court of Human Rights in Denmark v. Turkey (friendly settlement), judgment of 5 April 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV, pp. 7, 10 and 11, paras. 20 and 23. 731