State responsibility expressed in terms of years, has been laid down.696 The Swiss Federal Department in 1970 suggested a period of 20 to 30 years since the coming into existence of the claim.697 Others have stated that the requirements were more exacting for contractual claims than for non-contractual claims.698 None of the attempts to establish any precise or finite time limit for international claims in general has achieved acceptance.699 It would be very difficult to establish any single limit, given the variety of situations, obligations and conduct that may be involved. (10) Once a claim has been notified to the respondent State, delay in its prosecution (e.g. before an international tribunal) will not usually be regarded as rendering it inadmissible.700 Thus, in the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, ICJ held it to be sufficient that Nauru had referred to its claims in bilateral negotiations with Australia in the period preceding the formal institution of legal proceedings in 1989.701 In the Tagliaferro case, Umpire Ralston likewise held that, despite the lapse of 31 years since the infliction of damage, the claim was admissible as it had been notified immediately after the injury had occurred.702 (11) To summarize, a claim will not be inadmissible on grounds of delay unless the circumstances are such that the injured State should be considered as having acquiesced in the lapse of the claim or the respondent State has been seriously disadvantaged. International courts generally engage in a flexible weighing of relevant circumstances in the given case, taking into account such matters as the conduct of the respondent State and the importance of the rights involved. The decisive factor is whether the respondent State has suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay in the sense that the respondent could have reasonably expected that the claim would no longer be pursued. Even if there has been some prejudice, it may be able to be taken into account in determining the form or extent of reparation.703 696 In some cases time limits are laid down for specific categories of claims arising under specific treaties (e.g. the six-month time limit for individual applications under article 35, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights) notably in the area of private law (e.g. in the field of commercial transactions and international transport). See the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, as amended by the Protocol to the Convention. By contrast, it is highly unusual for treaty provisions dealing with inter-State claims to be subject to any express time limits. 697 Communiqué of 29 December 1970, in Annuaire suisse de droit international, vol. 32 (1976), p. 153. 698 C.-A. Fleischhauer, “Prescription”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law (see footnote 409 above), vol. 3, p. 1105, at p. 1107. 699 A large number of international decisions stress the absence of general rules, and in particular of any specific limitation period measured in years. Rather, the principle of delay is a matter of appreciation having regard to the facts of the given case. Besides Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (footnotes 230 and 232 above), see, e.g. Gentini (footnote 694 above), p. 561; and the Ambatielos arbitration, ILR, vol. 23, p. 306, at pp. 314–317 (1956). 700 For statements of the distinction between notice of claim and commencement of proceedings, see, e.g. R. Jennings and A. Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Harlow, Longman, 1992), vol. I, Peace, p. 527; and C. Rousseau, Droit international public (Paris, Sirey, 1983), vol. V, p. 182. 701 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections (see footnote 230 above), p. 250, para. 20. 702 Tagliaferro (see footnote 695 above), p. 593. 703 See article 39 and commentary. 123 Article 46. Plurality of injured States Where several States are injured by the same internationally wrongful act, each injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act. Commentary (1) Article 46 deals with the situation of a plurality of injured States, in the sense defined in article 42. It states the principle that where there are several injured States, each of them may separately invoke the responsibility for the internationally wrongful act on its own account. (2) Several States may qualify as “injured” States under article 42. For example, all the States to which an interdependent obligation is owed within the meaning of article 42, subparagraph (b) (ii), are injured by its breach. In a situation of a plurality of injured States, each may seek cessation of the wrongful act if it is continuing, and claim reparation in respect of the injury to itself. This conclusion has never been doubted, and is implicit in the terms of article 42 itself. (3) It is by no means unusual for claims arising from the same internationally wrongful act to be brought by several States. For example, in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case, four States brought proceedings before PCIJ under article 386, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Versailles, which allowed “any interested Power” to apply in the event of a violation of the provisions of the Treaty concerning transit through the Kiel Canal. The Court noted that “each of the four Applicant Powers has a clear interest in the execution of the provisions relating to the Kiel Canal, since they all possess fleets and merchant vessels flying their respective flags”. It held they were each covered by article 386, paragraph 1, “even though they may be unable to adduce a prejudice to any pecuniary interest”.704 In fact, only France, representing the operator of the vessel, claimed and was awarded compensation. In the cases concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, proceedings were commenced by the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel against Bulgaria concerning the destruction of an Israeli civil aircraft and the loss of lives involved.705 In the Nuclear Tests cases, Australia and New Zealand each claimed to be injured in various ways by the French conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll.706 (4) Where the States concerned do not claim compensation on their own account as distinct from a declaration 704 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 20. ICJ held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Israeli claim: Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 131, after which the United Kingdom and United States claims were withdrawn. In its Memorial, Israel noted that there had been active coordination of the claims between the various claimant Governments, and added: “One of the primary reasons for establishing coordination of this character from the earliest stages was to prevent, so far as was possible, the Bulgarian Government being faced with double claims leading to the possibility of double damages” (see footnote 363 above), p. 106. 706 See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) and (New Zealand v. France) (footnote 196 above), pp. 256 and 460, respectively. 705