İLHAN v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BONELLO, TULKENS, CASADEVALL, VAJIĆ AND GREVE 33 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GÖLCÜKLÜ (Translation) 1. To my great regret, I am unable to share the opinion of the majority of the Court, in particular regarding the dismissal of the Government's preliminary objection that the Court had no jurisdiction ratione personae and the application of Article 41 of the Convention. 2. I wholly agree with the majority that the system of individual petition provided under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights excludes applications by way of actio popularis (see paragraph 52 of the judgment in the instant case). However, the Court has accepted that persons (especially close relatives) who are very close to the real victim within the meaning of Article 34 may exceptionally be regarded as a “victim” if, for practical purposes, it was impossible for the real victim to exercise his right of individual petition, for instance because he is dead or suffering from some other incapacity. 3. In the instant case, the applicant's brother, that is to say the victim within the meaning of Article 34, was neither dead nor incapable of exercising his right of individual petition, as he was able to express his consent to being replaced by his brother and that consent was considered valid by the Court (see paragraph 54 of the judgment). 4. What I contest is the recognition given to the notion of “victim by proxy” accepted by the Court (see paragraph 55 of the judgment). 5. The Court has clearly defined, on more than one occasion, the notion of victim for the purposes of Article 34 (former Article 25) of the Convention, given its importance in the system of supervision that has been established. “According to the Court's established case-law, the word 'victim' in the context of Article 25 denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue ...” (see the Amuur v. France judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36; see also, among many other authorities, the Lüdi v. Switzerland judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 18, § 34). Logical conclusions flow from that definition. (a) Firstly, only “victims” within the meaning of Article 34 have standing to set in motion the system of supervision under the Convention. The Convention does not give “victims” power to delegate that standing to anyone else, no matter how closely connected. (b) Therefore, the fact that the real victim's consent has been obtained cannot have any effect in law. In other words, the real victim cannot by his consent or will transfer his standing as a victim to a third party. All he can do is to appoint a legal representative once he has lodged a complaint in due form with the Court as a victim within the meaning of Article 34.